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Abstract
This paper studies the corporate policy distortions caused by realization-based capital gains
taxation at the personal level in a dynamic trade-oﬀ theory model. The lock-in eﬀect of
embedded capital gains creates severe conﬂicts of interest between incumbent and new investors.
The ﬁrm’s optimal policy exhibits path-dependency and non-stationarity, since the tax basis of
the ﬁrm’s owners is a valuable conditioning variable for corporate decisions. Ex-ante identical
ﬁrms follow very diﬀerent investment and ﬁnancing policies depending on their stock price
evolution. Firms delay irreversible investment further the lower the tax basis of their owners
falls. The reason is the investment hedge provided by personal tax loss oﬀsets weakens as
investors reset their basis. Capital gains taxation also creates incentives to time equity issues.
Firms employ more equity in their capital structure the higher the stock price-to-basis ratio,
since locked-in investors with out-of-the-money tax timing options value the ﬁrm less than the
market. The value gain from conditioning on the owners’ tax basis is substantial. Using
simulated data I show the combined eﬀects are consistent with recent empirical evidence on the
relation between leverage, Tobin’s Q, and past performance.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G31, G32, H24, H32.
Keywords: Capital Gains Taxation, Real Options, Capital Structure, Trade-oﬀ Theory, Market Timing.
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One of the most vigorous debates among ﬁnance scholars and policymakers for the past decades has
been to which extent personal taxation distorts corporate investment and ﬁnancial policy. Yet, our
knowledge is limited due to the inherent intractability of models with a realization-based capital
gains tax system.1 The optionality in the timing of realization-based taxation “locks in” investors
and alters security valuations. Two investors with the same statutory tax rate can have diﬀerent
“eﬀective” tax rates simply because they have acquired the security at diﬀerent prices. Inevitably,
the Modigliani-Miller (1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) irrelevancy theorems break down.2
Traditional investment and ﬁnancing theories have since limited the analysis to accrual-based
capital gains taxation, which captures the deferred taxation but neglects the inherent optionality.3
Most of these models, however, lack explanatory power for observed patterns in external ﬁnanc-
ing, capital structure, and investment.4 Baker and Wurgler (2002) provide compelling evidence
that the history of a ﬁrm plays a pivotal role in determining capital structure, and they conclude
“capital structure is the cumulative outcome of a series of market-timing-motivated ﬁnancing de-
cisions.” Polk and Sapienza (2004), Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003), and Gilchrist, Himmelberg
and Huberman (2004) show stock prices inﬂuence corporate investment, and argue for behavioral
explanations.
This paper develops a tractable capital budgeting model under realization-based capital gains
taxation that can account for many of the features observed in the data. The lock-in eﬀect of
embedded capital gains causes severe conﬂicts of interest between the current owners of the ﬁrm
and new investors. The ﬁrm’s optimal policy exhibits path-dependency and non-stationarity,
1A large body of literature studies the valuation eﬀects of capital gains taxes (see Viard (2000), Klein (2001)),
and the portfolio and consumption implications (see Dammon, Spatt and Zhang (2001)).
2See Schneller (1980), Constantinides (1983), Balcer and Judd (1987), Lewellen and Mauer (1988).
3See Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989), Mello and Parsons (1992), Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). Novel
approaches include Hennessy and Whited (2004), Hackbarth, Miao and Morellec (2004), Titman and Tsyplakov
(2005). Auerbach (2001, p. 4) justiﬁes the reduced-form approach as follows: “[I]ncorporating a realization-based
capital gains tax would complicate the present analysis greatly, and is not as important [...].”
4Equity oﬀerings have been shown to be clustered in time, cyclical, and positively related to stock market perfor-
mance (Masulis and Korwar (1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996), Bayless and Chaplinsky
(1996), Lowry and Schwert (2002), Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2003)). Choe, Nanda and Masulis (1993) and
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) show that capital structure varies with macroeconomic conditions. Welch (2004) argues
capital structure dynamics are dominated by corporate inertia. Other empirical studies provide evidence that capital
structures only slowly revert back to optimal leverage ratios (see Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Alti (2004),
Hovakimian (2004), Huang and Ritter (2004), Kayhan and Titman (2004), Leary and Roberts (2004)).
1since corporate managers with aligned incentives condition their decisions on the tax basis of the
ﬁrm’s owners. Capital gains taxation further creates incentives to time equity issues, since locked-
in shareholders with out-of-the-money tax timing options value the ﬁrm less than the market.
Empirical proxies for a ﬁrm’s historical performance are therefore likely to have explanatory power
in cross-sectional regressions.
The main insight oﬀered by the paper is that the presence of a tax timing option at the personal
level can have a dramatic impact on corporate policy. There are two main eﬀects. Personal
taxation distorts the intertemporal link between uncertainty and irreversible investment, and it
alters the debt-equity trade-oﬀ. The timing eﬀect is that ﬁrms delay investment further, the
lower the tax basis of their owners falls. The ﬁnancing eﬀect is that ﬁrms employ more equity
ﬁnancing, the higher the stock price-to-basis ratio of their owners.
Figure 1 illustrates the two eﬀects. The graph plots a sample path for the ﬁrm’s operating
income or, equivalently, the stock price. The top line corresponds to the level of operating income
that triggers additional capital investment in the ﬁrm. The bottom line corresponds to the relevant
bankruptcy trigger. Whenever shareholders realize tax losses due to a drop in the stock price below
their current basis, the tax basis as illustrated by the middle line gets reset downward. Simultane-
ously, the ﬁrm optimally shifts the investment trigger (top line) upward, thus delaying investment
further. In this event the ﬁrm uses more equity to fund the project than in case the owners had
not reset. The interaction with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy can even lead to underinvestment, or
“excessive” delay, relative to the case without capital gains taxation.
The basic intuition for the timing eﬀect of capital gains taxes follows the classical insight in real
options theory that “the greater the uncertainty over future cash ﬂows, the larger is the excess return
the ﬁrm demands before making the irreversible investment,” Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Through
asymmetric taxation of gains versus losses the government shares investment risk disproportionately
and encourages “risk-loving” corporate behavior. Capital loss oﬀsets at the personal level reduce
investors’ uncertainty about after-tax payoﬀs in down-states. Since after-tax returns are relevant
for corporate decision making, the concavity in personal tax liabilities diminishes the value of the
ﬁrm’s real option to delay and a priori speeds up irreversible investment at the corporate level. The
investment stimulus is, however, only transitory. Incumbent investors optimally reset their tax basis






















Figure 1. Path-Dependency in the Firm’s Policy.
disappears. The ﬁrm’s management rationally responds by raising the investment threshold any
time the shareholders reset. Analog to a depletable resource, capital loss oﬀsets exploited before
real option exercise cannot again be utilized in the future when the new project performs poorly.
The ﬁnancing eﬀect of capital gains taxes results from asymmetric valuations of equity and
debt across the ﬁrm’s incumbent owners and new investors. Realization-based taxation creates an
embedded tax timing option with a value that is higher, the larger the tax basis. This drives a wedge
between the private valuations of locked-in incumbents and the market price. Corporate managers
acting in the interests of the ﬁrm’s current owners exploit the market’s valuation premium by issuing
more equity relative to debt, the larger the stock price-to-basis ratio of the owners. The ownership
dilution associated with equity issuance creates a surplus for incumbents with out-of-the-money
tax options, since every newly issued share entitles taxable investors to a new at-the-money tax
option granted by the government. Locked-in shareholders also prefer ownership dilution through
issuance of new shares to personal sales of existing shares, since the latter are accompanied by
realization of taxable gains. Across tax basis values, more locked-in (low-basis) shareholders have
3lower reservation values, or private valuations, than less locked-in (high-basis) shareholders. The
surplus extracted by the current shareholders from the dilution of ownership is therefore relatively
bigger, the larger the stock price-to-basis ratio.
A simple example illustrates the basic intuition behind the ﬁnancing eﬀect. Assume capital
gains are taxed upon realization at rate τ > 0, and ﬁnancial markets are competitive and frictionless
as in Constantinides (1983). There are no corporate or ordinary income taxes. For simplicity,
investors have no incentive for trade other than tax timing. The ﬁrm has assets in place that
generate a stochastic stream of dividends with value X. Valuations then consist of two parts—the
asset value and a tax timing option. If dividends follow a geometric Brownian motion process, the
value of the tax-loss selling option compounded into the stock price is a fraction (β −1) > 0 of the
asset value X, with 1 < β < 1/(1 − τ) as in Constantinides (1983). The share price thus equals
p0 = βX. Conversely, the present value of future loss oﬀsets is zero for incumbent shareholders
with negligible tax basis. Hence, their private valuation of the ﬁrm is v0 = X, which is strictly
less than the share price. Note that if they sold their shares, they would receive only (1 − τ)p0
after taxes, which is less than v0 since β < 1/(1 − τ). This implies they are “locked-in,” or
p0 > v0 > (1 − τ)p0. The ﬁrm now gets the one-time opportunity to double its capacity to 2X
by investing I. What is the investment rule and what is the optimal project ﬁnancing? If the
project is equity-ﬁnanced with n1 −1 new shares, the budget constraint p1(n1 −1) = I implies the
share price after investment equals p1 = β2X/n1 = β2X − I since n1 = β2X/(β2X − I). The
private valuation of the incumbent shareholders is v1 = 2X/n1 = 2X − β−1I. Hence, the ﬁrm
makes the investment if and only if X ≥ β−1I (⇔ p1 ≥ p0 ⇔ v1 ≥ v0). What happens in case the
project is ﬁnanced with riskless debt D1 = I? The share price, again, equals p1 = β2X − I, and
p1 ≥ p0 ⇔ X ≥ β−1I. In contrast, the valuation of the incumbent shareholders is v1 = 2X−I, and
thus lower than in the case of equity ﬁnancing. In summary, both incumbent and new investors
agree on the investment rule Invest if and only if X ≥ β−1I, but they have conﬂicting goals about
the optimal ﬁnancing. New shareholders are indiﬀerent between equity- and debt-ﬁnancing but
incumbents strictly prefer equity.
The predictions of the model for the cross-section and time-series of external ﬁnancing, cap-
ital structure and investment patterns have strong empirical support. Path-dependency, non-
stationarity, and market timing have all been shown to be features of actual corporate behavior.
4More generally, the model predicts that ex-ante identical ﬁrms follow diﬀerent investment and
ﬁnancial policies depending on their stock price evolution. In time-series, ﬁrms delay invest-
ment after temporary stock price declines that lead to tax-loss selling, e.g., in a recession. In
cross-section, mature ﬁrms with low-basis owners have lower investment hazards than high-basis
startups. The external ﬁnancing mix and capital structure dynamics also depend on the ﬁrm’s
past performance. Firms rationally time the market by issuing more equity and targeting lower
leverage ratios, the higher the stock price and the lower the basis of their owners. The resulting
capital structure dynamics are characterized by moving target leverage ratios which invalidates
the stationarity assumption in most empirical capital structure studies.5 The combination of the
timing and ﬁnancing eﬀects illustrates it is jointly optimal to invest at high market-to-book and
raise equity. This prediction is consistent with cross-sectional evidence that high Tobin’s Q ﬁrms
use more equity ﬁnancing and have lower leverage than low Q ﬁrms. More generally, the paper em-
phasizes the important role ownership structure plays in corporation ﬁnance. Even absent agency
conﬂicts between management and owners or conﬂicts of interest between bond- and stockholders,
the composition of ownership is crucial purely for personal tax reasons in explaining corporate
behavior.6
Numerical parameterizations show the distortions of personal taxes in corporate policy are eco-
nomically signiﬁcant. Firms optimally employ up to ten percentage points more equity in their
capital structure, the lower the basis-to-price ratio of their owners. The investment thresholds
can vary by more than 200% across ﬁrms with diﬀerent investor tax basis, and the expected in-
vestment dates can be years apart. In cross-sectional leverage regressions using simulated data,
the coeﬃcients on the external ﬁnancing-weighted market-to-book ratio are similar to the em-
pirical estimates in Baker and Wurgler (2002)—both for book and market leverage. Numerical
calculations illustrate that ﬁrms could proﬁt signiﬁcantly from pursuing a state-dependent policy
that takes into account the evolution of the owners’ tax basis. The value gain from switching to
the state-dependent policy is substantial and ranges from four to seven percent depending on the
parametrization.
5Most of the empirical tests of the trade-oﬀ theory against the pecking-order theory rely on stationarity assump-
tions (see Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002)).
6The catering theory of Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) complements this paper by stressing that clientele
eﬀects due to tax heterogeneity can contribute to explaining corporate payout policy.
5The results in this paper do not rely on market ineﬃciency or market frictions, they hold in per-
fect capital markets. Nonetheless, the qualitative predictions are robust to various imperfections.
The real-life reset behavior of investors diﬀers from the full exploit predicted by Constantinides
(1983) for a number of reasons including transaction costs, short-sale restrictions, wash-sale rules,
and behavioral biases (see Odean (1998)). The magnitude of the distortions determined in this
paper represent upper bounds for the ones likely to be observed in practice. The stock price
relative to the personal tax basis of the ﬁrm’s owners, or some weighted-average of them, should in
any case be a valuable conditioning variable for corporate managers acting in the interests of their
taxable shareholders.7
1.1 Related Literature
The paper follows a long tradition of studies on the link between taxes and the amount of risk-
taking. Domar and Musgrave (1944) were ﬁrst to note that the government shares private risks
through taxation. Gordon (1985) established that taxes do not distort investment only if the
reduction in expected returns is compensated by an equiproportional reduction in systematic risk.
The neutrality result breaks down with an asymmetric tax system, and nonlinearities in the tax
system can have important welfare eﬀects. Limited oﬀset provisions for corporate tax losses are one
example, realization-based capital gains taxes are another. Green and Talmor (1985), MacKenzie
(1994) and Faig and Shum (1996)—although in diﬀerent setups—all ﬁnd that imperfect corporate
tax loss oﬀsets lead to underinvestment, since the convexity in the tax liability induces “risk-averse”
behavior and discourages investment. In this paper the reverse eﬀect occurs due to the concavity
in personal taxes induced by realization-based capital gains taxation.8
7See Lewellen and Lewellen (2004) for an empirical investigation of this eﬀect.
8MacKie-Mason (1990) shows that non-convexities in corporate taxation may have “perverse” eﬀects on invest-
ment. Tax rate hikes may encourage, and subsidies may discourage investment. Mayer (1986) ﬁnds that ﬁnancing
ﬂexibility may dampen the adverse eﬀect of corporate tax asymmetry on investment. This paper looks at similar
issues related to realization-based capital gains taxation. Fazzari and Herzon (1995) argue that lowering the cap-
ital gains tax rate discourages incremental investment in the presence of undiversiﬁed risk. The prerequisite—as
discussed by Haliassos and Lyon (1994)—is that the government can eﬃciently redistribute the systematic risks and
diversify the idiosyncratic risks it takes on through risk-sharing with investors. Haliassos and Lyon (1994) further
show the risk-sharing eﬀects of capital gains taxes are important for encouraging stockholding, and that their excess
burden is negative. Closely related is the literature around Mello and Parsons (1992), Mauer and Triantis (1994),
Parrino and Weisbach (1999), Mauer and Sarkar (2003), Titman and Tsyplakov (2005) on dynamic investment and
ﬁnancing distortions due to agency conﬂicts between debt- and equityholders. The main focus in this paper is on
conﬂicts of interest between incumbent shareholders and outsiders due to the lock-in eﬀect of personal taxes.
6In the recent corporate ﬁnance literature there are several competing rationales for the behav-
ioral evidence in Baker and Wurgler (2002). Barclay, Morellec and Smith (2003) show that poor
corporate governance in conjunction with cross-sectional variation in growth options can lead to
the negative empirical relationship between book leverage and Tobin’s Q. Strebulaev (2004) limits
attention to market leverage and argues its empirical features arise mechanically in a standard
trade-oﬀ theory model along the lines of Fisher, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) or Goldstein, Ju and
Leland (2001). Hennessy and Whited (2004) abstract from Miller’s (1977) clientele equilibrium
eﬀects and develop a dynamic capital budgeting model with time-varying ﬁnancing margins that is
able to generate debt hysteresis and slow mean-reversion in the ﬁrm’s capital structure. This paper
produces predictions resembling the stylized facts about both market and book leverage without
introducing behavioral biases or cross-sectional variation in investment opportunities.
Plenty of support for the economic relevance of the eﬀects studied in this paper are provided
in the empirical taxation literature. Capital gains taxes have been found to be important de-
terminants both for investor behavior and for securities valuations. Evidence for tax-induced
trading can be found, for instance, in Dyl (1977), Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Badrinath and
Lewellen (1991), Odean (1998), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Ivkovi´ c, Poterba and Weisben-
ner (2004). Jin (2004) shows the lock-in eﬀect inﬂuences institutional trading and price reactions
to earnings announcements. Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) ﬁnd acquisition premia for
taxable acquisitions to be consistent with a lock-in eﬀect. Shackelford (2000) provides evidence
that stock prices capitalize capital gains taxes. Guenther and Willenborg (1999) show that capital
gains taxes are compounded into the oﬀer prices of small business IPOs.
The remainder is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the model and details the economic
assumptions. Section 3 discusses the implications of the model for corporate investment, capital
structure, and bankruptcy decisions. Subsequent Monte-Carlo simulations and regression results
illustrate the patterns in external ﬁnancing and capital structure that emerge based on a dynamic
trade-oﬀ theory model with personal taxes. Section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
72 The Model
In the following I set up the model, introduce the assumptions suﬃcient for retaining tractability,
and describe the solution approach. I start with the opportunity set of the ﬁrm, the tax code and
the economic environment. Then I discuss the issue of unanimity and deﬁne the objective function
for the ﬁrm. Last, I set up the ﬁrm’s optimization problem and provide solutions to the private
and public valuations of debt and equity.
2.1 The Assumptions
The ﬁrm goes public at t = 0 and has assets in place that generate pre-tax operating income πX,
π ∈ [0,1]. There is a risk-neutral measure Q under which X = (Xt)t≥0 is governed by a geometric
Wiener process with coeﬃcients (µ,σ). The after-tax risk-free rate is r > 0 and µ < r, σ > 0 are
given. That is
dXt = µXtdt + σXtdWt, X0 > 0, (1)
where W = (Wt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process on the probability space (Ω,F,Q).
The ﬁrm owns the perpetual rights to an irreversible investment project. At each date, the
ﬁrm can exercise the rights and step up capacity from πX to full scale X. The capital expenditure
required equals I > 0. The parameter π determines the growth potential of the ﬁrm, and will
be useful for calibration in Section 3.4. The two extreme values for π illustrate the nature of the
problem:
• π = 0 : The ﬁrm owns the right to an investment project and has no assets in place.
• π = 1 : The ﬁrm has no growth potential but is given the opportunity to reorganize its capital
structure. In this case, one can interpret I as underwriting and other issuance fees.
The initial capital structure consists of perpetual non-callable debt with promised coupon ﬂow
c0, and the number of shares outstanding is n0 = 1. The ﬁrm sells new securities—an optimal mix
of debt and equity—to fund the project. The number of shares after investment is denoted n1,
and c1 is the aggregate debt coupon after the second round of ﬁnancing.9 For simplicity, the old
9Intermediate capital restructurings besides bankruptcy are excluded to retain tractability. The capital structure
remains unchanged between the date of the ﬁrst and the second round of ﬁnancing, and after the investment date
until bankruptcy. Incorporating repeated capital restructurings into the model adds little qualitative insight about
8and new debt are issued pari passu.10 The ﬁrm’s management acting in favor of the shareholders
decides when to enter bankruptcy.11 Direct bankruptcy costs ω ∈ (0,1] consume a fraction of the
ﬁrm’s capital stock as in Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001). The bankruptcy procedure is designed
to minimize overall bankruptcy costs as described in Appendix A.
The tax code provisions and the ﬁnancial market structure resemble Constantinides (1983).
These assumptions capture the key aspects of realization-based capital gains taxation while pre-
serving consumption-portfolio separation. Financial markets are frictionless and competitive, and
collateralized short-sales are feasible as in Constantinides (1983). Investors are rational and taxable,
and have full use of capital loss oﬀsets.12 Capital gains are taxed upon realization at statutory rate
τ. The provisions for ordinary income taxation are standard. The personal tax rates on interest
and dividend income are τp and τd, respectively. The ﬁrm is subject to corporate income taxation
at marginal rate τc, and it distributes its net income as dividends since the double-taxation imposes
a prohibitive cost on internal funds.13 Debt services are tax-deductible with full loss oﬀsets. The
eﬀective tax rate on ordinary income from equity is
τe = 1 − (1 − τc)(1 − τd), (2)
and the double-taxation of internal funds is14
φ = (1 − τe)/(1 − τp). (3)
the eﬀect of capital gains taxes but complicates the analysis considerably. See Leland (1994) for a model with no
restructurings other than bankruptcy. In the presence of deadweight external ﬁnancing costs external ﬁnancing
events for restructuring purposes occur infrequently. See Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) for a model that relates
the frequency of external ﬁnancing events to the magnitude of reﬁnancing costs. In practice external ﬁnancing events
do occur infrequently.
10This assumption is not crucial but simpliﬁes the valuation of debt, since all debt claimants have the same recovery
ratio in the event of bankruptcy. In addition, it allows the analysis of how capital gains taxation aﬀects ﬁnancial
risk-shifting incentives, that is the ﬁrm may exploit existing debtholders by issuing new risky debt.
11Intermediate funding shortfalls are met through rights issues to existing equityholders, where management has
leeway in setting the subscription price to keep the aggregate tax basis unaﬀected. In eﬀect this resembles the
negative dividends or deep pockets assumption in Fischer, Heinkel and Zechner (1989) and Leland (1994).
12Currently, deductibility of capital losses from ordinary income is limited to $3000 per annum. Capital losses that
are not accounted for in a given calendar year may be deducted from the investors’ taxable income in consecutive
years. In the model shorting-against-the-box does not evade capital gains taxation, since net short-sale proceeds
depend as in Constantinides (1983) on the basis of the particular share being borrowed.
13For tractability I omit the choice between dividends and share repurchases (see Green and Holliﬁeld (2003)).
14Miller (1977) argued in a static setting without lock-in eﬀect that tax clienteles lead to φ = 1 for the marginal
income tax bracket. Setting 0 < φ < (1 − τ) in this paper can be supported with the empirical ﬁndings in Graham
(1999, 2000) and the fact that the actual tax code is realization-based—creating a lock-in eﬀect.
92.2 The Investors’ Tax Timing Problem
The assumptions in Section 2.1 guarantee all investors pursue the same simple tax timing policy.
Proposition 1 Investors’ optimal trading strategy is deferment of capital gains and immediate
realization of capital losses until the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy. Investors are “locked-in” whenever
the market price exceeds their basis. By the time of bankruptcy, all equityholders have reset their
tax basis to zero. The bankruptcy decision is therefore supported unanimously by all equityholders.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for the second part of Proposition 1 is that the share price is falling as the
ﬁrm approaches bankruptcy. While they may have heterogeneous basis values, all shareholders
optimally realize losses and reset their basis values on the way down. By the time the equity value
reaches zero, the heterogeneity will have been eliminated since all tax bases are nil.
The lock-in eﬀect described in Proposition 1 drives a wedge between the private valuations of
incumbent investors and the market price. The optionality inherent in the tax code generates an
embedded tax timing option. The value of this tax-loss selling option is larger the higher the tax
basis, since the strike of the embedded put option equals the basis. Private valuations, therefore,
diﬀer across investors with diﬀerent basis values—notwithstanding the fact that all investors receive
the same amount of dividends or coupon payments, respectively.
I denote by Mt the minimum pre-tax earnings until date t ≤ κu, where κu ∈ T is the stopping
time for real option exercise and T is the set of all stopping times adapted to the ﬁltration F
generated by X. That is I associate with X the stopped minimum process M = (Mt)t≥0,
Mt = inf0≤s≤min(t,κu) Xs. (4)
Proposition 1 implies that in perfect capital markets the tax basis of the initial shareholders equals
the historical minimum stock price at all times starting with the IPO, since they engage in tax-loss
selling whenever the stock price falls to a new low. Since the stock price is monotonic in X, there is
a one-to-one mapping between historical stock price lows and the process M. Thus, Mt coincides
at any date t ≤ κu with the optimal basis reset threshold for the initial shareholders.
10Let (x,m) denote realizations of (X,M) in the state space S = {(x,m) ∈ R+ × R+ : x ≥ m} ,
and deﬁne
vi(x,m;B) : Private equity valuation of a share with tax basis B,
vi(x,m) : Private equity valuation of the initial shareholders,
pi(x,m) : Stock price,
Di(x,m) : Market price of the aggregate debt outstanding.
i = 0,1 : before (0) or after (1) investment takes place.
The competitive clearing condition (cf. Williams (1985), Dammon and Spatt (1996)) requires
that the market price is set by new investors. Since they enter with a basis equal to the market
price, the market price compounds an at-the-money tax timing option. This creates the following
ﬁxed-point problem
pi(x,m) = vi(x,m;pi(x,m)), i = 0,1, (x,m) ∈ S. (5)
Proposition 1 has a number of implications for both investor and corporate behavior. Investors’
optimal strategy is one of instantaneous control by keeping the basis-to-price ratio from exceeding
unity. Denote by bi(m;B) the value of pre-tax income X that triggers tax-loss selling of a share
with basis B. Proposition 1 thus implies vi(x,m;B) 5 pi(x,m) for x = bi(m;B), i = 0,1, and
pi(bi(m;B),m) = B. (6)
Hence, private valuations of incumbents are (weakly) lower than the market price since investors
with a basis above the market price immediately reset. Finally, Proposition 1 and condition (5)
imply that the private valuations of the initial owners satisfy
vi(x,m) = vi(x,m;pi(m,m)), i = 0,1. (7)
112.3 The Firm’s Capital Budgeting Problem and Valuation
Proposition 1 further carries important implications for the ﬁrm’s decision problem. Investors with
diﬀerent basis values generally disagree about value maximization.15 The Modigliani and Miller
(1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) irrelevancy theorems break down, since investors cannot self-select
themselves into clienteles once they are locked-in. Stock price maximization is therefore not a
time-consistent ﬁrm objective.
A natural choice for the ﬁrm’s objective is to assume management commits to maximizing the
private valuations of the initial shareholders—given the large portion of family and top manage-
ment allocations documented in IPOs (see Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997)). This objective is
well-deﬁned, since collateral requirements preclude tax-arbitrage and align the incentives of con-
tinuing investors with those of exiting ones. New investors, although they disagree, are not being
expropriated since they rationally anticipate the ﬁrm’s policy and pay a fair price when they enter.
The ﬁrm’s decisions concern when to exercise the growth option, how to optimally fund the
investment with debt and equity, and when to declare bankruptcy. In the interests of the initial
shareholders the ﬁrm’s policy must take their current tax basis and its future evolution into account.
A simple time-independent trigger strategy as in McDonald and Siegel (1986) is not optimal. Yet,
it is suﬃcient to know the current value of operating income Xt = x and its historical minimum
Mt = m, since Proposition 1 implies the initial shareholders realize losses whenever the stock
price, or equivalently X, falls to a new low. The ﬁrm’s decision problem is therefore Markov in
(x,m) ∈ S.
The policy functions, u(m),c1(m),n1(m),l0,l1(m), deﬁned on M = {(m) ∈ R+ : m ≤ m ≤ m}
with m = l0 and m = sup(m ∈ R+ : u(m) ≥ m) represent
u(m) : Investment boundary,
c1(m) : Aggregate debt coupon ﬂow after the second round of ﬁnancing,
n1(m) : Number of shares outstanding after the second round of ﬁnancing,
l0,l1(m) : Bankruptcy thresholds before and after investment.
(8)
15See Schneller (1980) and Lewellen and Mauer (1988). In this paper the lock-in eﬀect of capital gains taxes
precludes investor unanimity about the ﬁnancing mix, the investment timing, and between debt- and equityholders
also about the bankruptcy date. Maximizing their private valuations is in the interests of locked-in investors, whereas
new investors in ﬁnancial markets perceive market-value maximization as optimal.
12All policy functions are smooth in m ∈ M, since M has continuous paths and the decision problem
is well-behaved (cf. Pedersen (2000), Guo and Shepp (2001), and Peskir (2001)). The optimal
default trigger l0 before investment is independent of m, since shareholders vote unanimously on
the optimal bankruptcy policy. The corresponding hitting times (whichever comes ﬁrst) are
Investment date : κu ≡ inf(t ≥ 0 : Xt ≥ u(inf0≤s≤t Xs)), (9)
Bankruptcy date : κ0
l ≡ inf(t ≥ 0 : Xt ≤ l0). (10)
The ﬁrm’s optimization problem amounts to optimal stopping and control on the boundary of
the continuation region C = {(x,m) ∈ S : m ≤ x ≤ u(m),m ∈ M}. If x > m the ﬁrm invests
immediately, and if x < m the ﬁrm immediately declares bankruptcy. Figure 2 illustrates the
bankruptcy region (L), the continuation region (C), and the investment region (U) in the state
space S. The arrows indicate the feasible direction of movement in the state space for the cases
x > m and x = m, respectively. More formally, the optimization problem is
supu(m),c1(m),n1(m),l0,l1(m) v0(x,m) (11)
subject to the budget constraint
p1(u(m),m)[n1(m) − 1] + D1(u(m),m) − D0(u(m),m) = I, (12)
and (c0,π,I) are given, and m ∈ M.
The objective function in (11) represents the private equity valuation of a representative investor
with basis equal to the historical minimum stock price. The constraint (12) says the proceeds from
issuing n1(m)−1 new shares and D1(·)−D0(·) in new debt suﬃce to cover the capital expenditure
I > 0. In case n1(m) < 1, the ﬁrm repurchases shares through brokers. Competitiveness of
ﬁnancial markets requires that the oﬀer price of new securities equals their market price after
issuance and there is no price reaction, or p0(u(m)−,m) = p1(u(m)+,m).






x(x,m) − rv0(x,m) + (πx − c0)(1 − τe) = 0 for (x,m) ∈ C, (13)
with the value-matching and smooth-ﬁt conditions
v0(x,m) = v1(x,m), v0
x(x,m) = v1
x(x,m) for x = u(m),
v0(x,m) = 0, v0
x(x,m) = 0 for x = m = l0,
v0(x,m) = p0(m,m), v0
m(x,m) = τ
1−τv0
x(x,m) for x = m.
(14)
The solution to v1(x,m) = supc1,n1 v1(x,m;p0(m,m)|c1,n1) subject to (12) determines (c1(m),n1(m))
for all m ∈ M.
The ﬁrst line in (14) determines the optimal investment boundary u(m). The ﬁrm’s optimal
investment policy takes a particularly simple form while M = (Mt)t≥0 is constant. Conditional
on Mt = m, the decision rule is a time-homogeneous trigger strategy as in McDonald and Siegel
(1986). On the boundary {(x) : x = u(m),m ∈ M} it satisﬁes the smooth-ﬁt principle (see
Pedersen (2000), and Peskir (2001)). The limited liability of shareholders leads in (14) to the
second pair of value-matching and smooth-ﬁt conditions. They determine the bankruptcy trigger
l0. The last two conditions in (14) come out of the tax timing problem of the initial shareholders
(cf. Constantinides (1983) and Williams (1985)).16 In more detail, using (6, 7) the optimality
conditions for tax-loss selling in the special case B = p0(m,m) are
v0(x,m) = (1−τ)p0(x,m)+τp0(m,m), v0
x(x,m) = (1−τ)[p0
x(x,m)+p0
m(x,m)] for x = m. (15)
The functional form for p0(x,m) at times when X falls to a new low, p0(m) ≡ p0(m,m),
and similarly for p0(x,m) at x > m, can be determined by using the identity (6) and rewriting the
optimality conditions (15) as a diﬀerential equation for p0(m). One obtains the following conditions:
p0(m) = v0(m,m) and p0
m(m) = 1
1−τv0
x(m,m) for l0 < m ≤ u(m), and p0(m) = p0
m(m) = 0 for
m = l0.
The private valuation functions v1(x,m), vi(x,m;B), i = 0,1, and the prices of debt, D0(·)
16The last condition in (14) represents “normal reﬂection” at the diagonal. See Grigelionis and Shiryaev (1966),
Dubins, Shepp and Shiryaev (1993).
14and D1(·), satisfy similar conditions that are relegated to Appendix C. The next proposition
summarizes the solutions.
Proposition 2 The private equity valuation of a share associated with basis B equals
v0(x,m;B) = λπx − δc0 + ϕ0
b(x,m;B)[B − (λπb0(m;B) − δc0)]
+ϕ0
u(x,m;B)[v1(u(m),m;B) − (λπu(m) − δc0)], (16)
v1(x,m;B) = (λx − δc1)/n1 + ϕ1
b(x,m;B)[B − (λb1(m;B) − δc1)/n1], (17)
where
β = (1 + γ)/(1 + γ − τ) ,
δ = (1 − τe)/r,






































b(x,m;B) = (x−γu(m)−η − u(m)−γx−η)/((b0)−γu(m)−η − u(m)−γ(b0)−η), (18)
ϕ0
u(x,m;B) = ((b0)−γx−η − x−γ(b0)−η)/((b0)−γu(m)−η − u(m)−γ(b0)−η), (19)
ϕ1
b(x,m;B) = (b1)γx−γ, (20)
ϕ1
l (x,m) = (l1)γx−γ. (21)











p1(x,m) = (βλx − δc1)/n1 − ϕ1
l (x,m)
1
1−τ (βλl1 − δc1)/n1, (23)
15with f(x,m), g(x,m,z) and h(x,z) given in the Appendix.
The market value of the aggregate debt after investment (and similarly of the old and new debt
issues with c1 replaced by c0 and c1 − c0, respectively) is
D1(x,m) = c1(1 − τp)

ρ1(x,m) . (24)
The after-tax yield is the same for both the old and the new debt issue, since they have equal priority:





α = 1 − (1 − ω)ζξφ (26)
measures the total bankruptcy cost and is decreasing in τ. In (26) the constant coeﬃcient ζ ≡
V ∗(l1)/(λl1) represents the ex-ante gains to leverage (where V ∗(x) is the market value of the opti-
mally recapitalized ﬁrm), and ξ ≡ (λl1)/(δc1). Both ζ and ξ are given in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
Some Special Cases. In the special case τ = 0, expressions (23) and (24) for the time after
investment collapse to the perpetual debt model in Leland (1994). The value of the embedded tax
option vanishes and private valuations (16) and (17) coincide with the share prices (22) and (23).
The optimal investment trigger u(m) becomes a time-independent trigger u as in McDonald and
Siegel (1986). The stock price is independent of m and equals
p0(x,m) = πλx − δc0 −
x−γu−η − u−γx−η
(l0)−γu−η − u−γ(l0)−η(πλl0 − δc0)
+
(l0)−γx−η − x−γ(l0)−η
(l0)−γu−η − u−γ(l0)−η[p1(u,m) − (πλu − δc0)], (27)
p1(x,m) = (λx − δc1)/n1 − (l1)γx−γ(λl1 − δc1)/n1. (28)
In the special case c1 = 0 (n1 = 1) and τ > 0, the valuations in period 1 coincide with the
equations in Constantinides (1983, footnote 6) for the value of an unlevered ﬁrm. The basis reset
16trigger, b1(m;B), equals B/(βλ) and
v1(x,m;B) = β−1p1(x,m) + (1 − β−1)B1+γp1(x,m)−γ, (29)
p1(x,m) = βλx. (30)
A comparison of the two special cases to the general solution (16)-(26) illustrates the eﬀect of
personal taxes on private valuations, market prices, and bankruptcy costs:
The General Case. Private equity valuations (16, 17) consist of two components—the present
value of dividend distributions after ordinary income taxes and the present value of the stream of
capital loss oﬀsets. Shareholders receive after-tax dividends (πXt − c0)(1 − τe) before investment
and, respectively, (Xt − c1)(1 − τe)/n1 per share after investment. Accordingly, the ﬁrst terms
in (16) and (17) are the after income-tax values of the perpetual dividend ﬂow. Once operating
income Xt falls to bi(Mt;B), i = 0,1, investors with basis B sell their shares. They receive after-
tax proceeds equal to B per share (= (1 − τ)pi(bi(Mt;B),Mt) + τB). The second terms in (16)
and (17) represent the value of this timing option including the value of limited liability. The
third term in (16) reﬂects the value of the real option to invest and restructure. Finally, the terms
ϕ0
b and ϕ0
u are the pre-tax values of state-contingent claims that pay either a single unit when Xt
hits the basis-reset threshold b0(Mt;B) before the investment boundary u(Mt) (subscript b) or,
respectively, when Xt hits u(Mt) before b0(Mt;B) (subscript u).
The eﬀect of capital gains taxes on prices becomes apparent in (23). The coeﬃcient β captures
the personal tax beneﬁt associated with volatility. Note that β is monotonically increasing in σ
and τ, and it satisﬁes 1 ≤ β < (1−τ)−1 as in Constantinides (1983). Riskless coupon ﬂows c1, on
the other hand, are not associated with a tax option premium in (23). The price of a bankruptcy
contingent claim, however, is discounted due to the fact that investors collect capital loss oﬀsets
on the path to bankruptcy. This is captured by the exponent 1
1−τ on ϕ1
l in (23). In (22), the
second integral represents the after-tax value of dividend income plus tax loss oﬀsets until operating
income falls to m. The ﬁrst term captures the risk-adjusted present value of after-tax cash ﬂows
starting at the latter date and ending once shareholders make use of their limited liability.
173 The Eﬀect on Corporate Policy and the Empirical Implications
In the following, I discuss the main predictions of the model. Section 3.1 outlines qualitative
properties of the ﬁrm’s optimal bankruptcy policy. In section 3.2, I decompose the eﬀects of
realization-based capital gains taxation into ﬁnancing and timing eﬀects. I calculate the value of
switching to a state-dependent policy in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 provides simulation results, and
section 3.5 brieﬂy discusses the robustness of the predictions to capital market imperfections.
3.1 The Optimal Bankruptcy Policy
The ﬁrst result is an irrelevancy theorem for the ﬁrm’s bankruptcy decision under realization-based
capital gains taxation. The result follows intuitively from Proposition 1 and allows an explicit
solution to the bankruptcy problem after investment.
Proposition 3 The shareholder value-maximizing bankruptcy trigger after investment does not
depend on the capital gains tax rate τ. The optimal bankruptcy threshold l1 is proportional to the








Proposition 3 implies that the outcome of a one-time capital structure decision under realization-
based capital gains taxation is observationally equivalent to the one under accrual-based taxation
(see, e.g., Leland (1994)). The reason is that—as shown in Proposition 1 in Section 2—by the
time of bankruptcy all shareholders have reset their basis values to nil. Once the basis is zero
private equity valuations are independent of the capital gains tax rate—which can be seen by setting
B = 0 in (17). As a result, the optimal bankruptcy trigger l1 is independent of τ. Nonetheless,
realization-based capital gains taxation has testable implications for dynamic corporate policy, since
the locked-in eﬀect distorts investment and funding decisions.
Irrespective of the irrelevance of capital gains taxation for the timing of bankruptcy, capital
gains taxes aﬀect debt valuations through the magnitude of expected bankruptcy costs. The total
18bankruptcy costs incurred at the bankruptcy date are α δ
φc1. They represent a constant fraction α
of the default-free debt value, since both pre- and post-restructuring debt coupons are proportional
to l1. The trade-oﬀs debtholders face in bankruptcy are altered by the presence of capital gains
taxation since α varies with τ.17
3.2 The Optimal Investment and Financial Policy
The next result characterizes how the initial shareholders’ tax basis, or alternatively m, aﬀects the
optimal mix of debt and equity ﬁnancing, c1(m),n1(m).
Proposition 4 Firms use more equity to fund their investment project, the lower the basis (i.e.,
the larger the embedded capital gains) of their shareholders. That is
∂c1(x|B)
∂B ≥ 0 given x and c0.
The optimal capital structure is path-dependent on the stock price evolution prior to restructuring,
since the stock price path determines the owners’ basis.
In the limit as the basis-price ratio approaches one and c0 = 0, the target leverage ratio after the
second round of ﬁnancing equals the ex-ante optimal static leverage ratio. The latter is increasing






The constant coeﬃcient ϑ is given in the Appendix.
Proof. See Appendix.
The second part of Proposition 4 provides suﬃcient conditions for the ex-ante and ex-post
ﬁnancing problems to have identical outcomes. The term ex-post refers to the situation in which
a tax basis has already been assigned and is predetermined, whereas in the ex-ante case the tax
basis is endogenous. The solutions to the ex-ante and ex-post ﬁnancing problems generally diﬀer.
Proposition 4 establishes that the ex-ante optimum coincides with the ex-post optimal capital
structure if there are no conﬂicts of interest among the various stakeholders. If the ﬁrm is unlevered
(c0 = 0), debt-equityholder conﬂicts trivially disappear. In the limit as the basis-to-price ratio
approaches unity there is unanimity among incumbent shareholders and outsiders.
17Given the assumption of perfect capital markets α is decreasing in τ as shown in Proposition 2. The reason is
that through the embedded tax timing option capital gains taxes positively aﬀect the price at which new securities
can be issued.
19The intuition for the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 is simple but requires some care, since several
eﬀects oﬀset each other. In the following I decompose the eﬀects of realization-based capital gains
taxation on ﬁnancing and investment. I also provide guidance on the economic magnitude of the
eﬀects. I start by quantifying the variation in capital structure ratios and investment rates, and
show how the size of the investment project aﬀects the value of the option to delay. I determine
the value of conditioning on the owners’ tax basis in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4, I run capital
structure regressions on simulated data to assess the empirical relevance of the eﬀects.
3.2.1 The Financing Eﬀect
The ﬁnancing eﬀect described in Proposition 4 is the result of asymmetric valuations of debt and
equity across investors with diﬀerent tax basis. The trade-oﬀs in the ex-ante decision problem are
between interest tax shields due to corporate taxation, bankruptcy costs, and the income eﬀect of
capital gains taxation.
The income eﬀect of realization-based capital gains taxes is that potential tax payments, loss
oﬀsets, and tax credits are all compounded into pre-tax valuations. In particular, the government
provides investors through capital loss oﬀsets and tax credits with a hedge in the event the share
price drops. The resulting tax timing option compounded into the market price is always at-the-
money. The marginal investor who determines the market price is subject to just this income
eﬀect.18
The arbitrage eﬀect of realization-based capital gains taxation is driven by a wedge between the
private valuations of incumbent investors and the market price. Since the value of the embedded tax
timing option is larger the higher the tax basis, incumbent investors have lower private valuations
than new investors whenever the market price exceeds their basis (see Section 2.2). This valuation
diﬀerential is crucial when raising external ﬁnancing. Issuing equity is a local tax arbitrage
opportunity for incumbent shareholders—similar to issuing debt for interest tax shield purposes.19
18In bankruptcy debtholders beneﬁt from the income eﬀect of capital gains taxes. The initial oﬀer price of reissued
capital compounds potential future loss oﬀsets. In the model, the income eﬀect increases residual ﬁrm value, and
lowers the overall bankruptcy costs α. The reason is that market prices increase in the capital gains tax rate τ, since
the discounted value of future capital loss oﬀsets is strictly positive and increasing in τ.
19See Ross (1987). The arbitrage eﬀect is, in general, dependent on the use of the ﬁnancing proceeds. The value
of the tax timing option is an increasing function of the volatility of the combined cash ﬂow stream from current
operations and new investments. Positive correlation between the ﬁrm’s current and future business is advantageous,
20Every newly issued share entitles new investors to an at-the-money tax option provided by the
government—given the investor is taxable. The ownership dilution associated with new equity
issues creates a surplus equal in magnitude to the diﬀerence between the reservation values of the
new investors (i.e., the competitive market price) and of the incumbent shareholders (i.e., their
private valuations). In competitive markets, incumbent owners can capture the entire surplus
created by issuing equity. For low-basis owners, since their reservation values are lower, the
surplus is larger in relative terms than for high-basis owners—although the ownership dilution and
the amount of funds raised per share are the same. The ﬁrm’s management takes this into account
and optimally issues more equity, the larger the stock price-to-basis ratio.
The hedging eﬀect is a positive externality of riskless coupon payments on private equity valu-
ations. In general, the source of funds aﬀects the volatility of ﬂows to equity, thereby altering the
value of existing tax timing options. Additional debt payments raise the volatility of the residual
equity claim. This represents a tax-advantage for incumbent shareholders. The result is an in-
crease in the value of the equity-embedded tax option and, in turn, in private equity valuations.
The hedging eﬀect shifts the optimal ﬁnancing mix towards debt.
The magnitudes of both the arbitrage eﬀect and the hedging eﬀect depend on the tax basis.
The arbitrage eﬀect (favoring equity) is stronger, the smaller the basis-to-price ratio. The reason
is private valuations (17) are increasing in B and, thus, valuation diﬀerentials between incumbent
and new investors are decreasing in B. The hedging externality of coupon payments on the value
of existing tax timing options (favoring debt) is larger, the larger the basis-to-price ratio. The
reason is that the sensitivity of the tax option value with respect to c1 in (17) is increasing in
absolute terms with the tax basis B (and τ). Although the two eﬀects work in opposite directions,
i.e., the arbitrage eﬀect represents a tax-advantage to equity and the hedging eﬀect represents a
since it increases the overall volatility and diminishes the adverse eﬀect of Jensen’s inequality on the value of embedded
tax timing options. The “eﬀective” tax rate on equity is a decreasing function of volatility and of signed correlation.
As a result, hedging is non-neutral. The intuition follows from the standard result in ﬁnancial option pricing theory
that an option’s vega is always positive, i.e., the value of an option increases with volatility. The tax timing decision
of equityholders corresponds to an embedded American option pricing problem. Therefore given an arbitrary tax
basis, or tax option strike price, the tax option value increases with the operational and ﬁnancial risk characteristics
of the ﬁrm. As a result, private equity valuations fall if the proceeds from external ﬁnancing are invested risk-free,
since it reduces the volatility of future earnings. Investing the proceeds in less than perfectly correlated ﬁnancial
instruments is disadvantageous for the same reason. In the model, the new funds are used for a perfectly correlated
expansion project, which entirely eliminates the eﬀect of Jensen’s inequality. I leave for future work the study of less
than perfectly correlated investment projects, mergers and takeovers, spinoﬀs, etc.
21tax-advantage to debt, across tax bases they have the same impact. Both imply that low-basis
shareholders ﬁnd equity more and debt less attractive than high-basis shareholders. Proposition
4 shows that as a result the target leverage ratio depends positively on the basis-to-price ratio.
3.2.2 How large are the ﬁnancing distortions?
Table 2 quantiﬁes the resulting variation in the optimal ﬁnancing mix and in both the ex-ante
and ex-post optimal capital structure. I report both target leverage ratios and credit spreads at
the issuance date. I vary the basis-to-price ratio at the investment date between 0% and 100%
by conditioning on the historical minimum, m ∈ [m,m], relative to where it falls in between the
bankruptcy trigger m = l0 and the value corresponding to immediate investment, m = sup(m ∈
R+ : u(m) ≥ m). The base parameterizations are summarized in Table 1 and c0 = 0, π = 100%.
The ﬁrst panel in Table 2 shows that in the base parametrization with τ = 25%, the cross-
sectional dispersion in target leverage ratios ranges up to 9.2 percentage points. Firms with
shareholders that have a negligible tax basis (due to prior loss realizations) have a target leverage
of 60.7 percent compared to 69.9 percent for ﬁrms with a basis-price ratio of one at the restructuring
date. As shown in the second panel of Table 2, this translates into a debt yield for the zero-basis
ﬁrms that is 45 bp lower than for the highest basis ﬁrms. In case the basis-to-price ratio at the
restructuring date is 100% (0%), leverage in the base parametrization with τ = 25% is 3.5 points
higher (5.7 points lower) than in the case without capital gains taxation. The eﬀect of capital
gains taxes on aggregate leverage is thus not uniform across basis values. Last, the ex-ante optimal
static leverage ratio is equal to the value in the column corresponds to a basis-to-price ratio of one.
The results in the ﬁrst and second panel, respectively, conﬁrm that the ex-ante optimal leverage
ratio increases and that the ex-ante target credit spread decreases with the capital gains tax rate.
The remaining rows in both panels of Table 2 demonstrate that the predictions are robust to
diﬀerent parameterizations. The cross-sectional variation in target leverage is larger, the smaller
the direct bankruptcy costs (∆ = 9.9%/ 55 bp if ω = 25%). Similarly, a reduction in the double-
taxation of corporate income increases the dispersion in ex-post optimal leverage ratios. For
instance if φ equals 75%, the target leverage of a ﬁrm with negligible tax basis is 53.5 percent
compared to 65.3 percent if the basis-price ratio is one—a diﬀerence of close to twelve points.
223.2.3 The Timing Eﬀect
The basic intuition for the eﬀect of realization-based capital gains taxes on the timing of corporate
investment can be gained from the standard result in real options theory that “the greater the
uncertainty over future cash ﬂows, the larger is the excess return the ﬁrm demands before making
the irreversible investment,” Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Realization-based capital gains taxation
distorts the relation between irreversible investment and uncertainty by altering the risk character-
istics of after-tax cash ﬂows. The government shares investment risk disproportionately through
asymmetric taxation of gains and losses. Tax credits and oﬀset provisions in loss-states create
concave tax liabilities and induce “risk-loving” corporate behavior. Therefore, realization-based
capital gains taxation a priori diminishes the value of the option to delay investment and lowers the
critical threshold for irreversible investment. However, the concavity in the personal tax liabilities
vanishes endogenously, i.e., the kink in the eﬀective tax schedule moves down, if investors reset
their tax basis before the ﬁrm’s real option exercise. The investment stimulus due to capital gains
taxes is thus only transitory. The ﬁrm’s management rationally anticipates that the owners can
deduct fewer capital losses in the future when the investment project performs poorly, since capital
loss tax shields have already been used up before investment has taken place. As a result, the
critical threshold for investment shifts up whenever shareholders realize tax losses.20
3.2.4 How large are the investment distortions?
Table 3 reports comparative statics for the investment policy u(m) as a function of the running
minimum m in the case π = 1. The eﬀect of the parameter π is illustrated in Table 4. Each
line in Table 3 represents an alteration of the base parametrization from Table 1. Separate results
20In more detail, both the marginal value of exercising the growth option and the marginal value of waiting depend
on the tax basis. The propensity to keep the ﬁrm’s capacity low and save the option to expand for later use
increases as the tax basis B decreases, i.e.,
∂2
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1(·) ≤ 0, since the option delta of the embedded tax loss put option becomes smaller in magnitude as
B decreases. At the optimal investment date the marginal value of exercising the growth option and the marginal
value of waiting must be equal. Inevitably, the investment threshold depends on the tax basis of the ﬁrm’s owners.
How the basis aﬀects the investment threshold, however, depends on the ﬁnancial policy. Optimal ﬁnancing of the
project is suﬃcient for the investment boundary to be monotonically decreasing in B. The predictions are diﬀerent
under exogenous ﬁnancing. Equity ﬁnancing is a tax arbitrage for locked-in shareholders. In case of exogenous
pure equity-ﬁnancing, the arbitrage eﬀect is so strong that low-basis ﬁrms will take advantage of the tax arbitrage
sooner than high-basis ﬁrms. The investment trigger becomes a monotonically increasing function of the tax basis.
The opposite occurs with exogenous debt ﬁnancing. In extensive simulations under exogenous ﬁnancing I ﬁnd the
investment boundary to be increasing in m only under close to pure equity ﬁnancing.
23for capital gains tax rates varying between 0% and 35% are reported for the base parametrization.
In the diﬀerent columns, m varies within [m,m] which corresponds to basis-to-price ratios (BPu-
ratio) between zero and one at the investment date. The second panel of Table 3 characterizes the
investment policy in terms of the market equity value-to-investment ratio at the investment date.
The common feature in all parameterizations is that the optimal investment trigger u(m) shifts
upward as m falls. In the base parametrization with τ = 25%, the threshold for a BPu-ratio
of zero is 178 percent higher than for a BPu-ratio of one. Compared to an otherwise identical
economy without realization-based capital gains taxation, real option exercise is accelerated only
for BPu-ratios above approximately 30%. The second panel in Table 3 shows that the net eﬀect
on the market value of equity at the restructuring date is even more dramatic. In the base
parametrization, the lock-in eﬀect creates variation in the market value of the ﬁrm’s equity at
t = κu of up to 260%.
The predictions for corporate investment from these comparative statics results are distinct,
testable patterns in both the cross-section and time-series. In general, events that cause the
stock price to fall and shareholders to realize losses, such as poor ﬁrm performance or negative
macroeconomic shocks, have long-term impact on capital budgeting decisions. Short-term stock
price ﬂuctuations lead to long-term reductions in investment rates and leverage ratios. Corporate
inertia as documented in Welch (2004) is more pronounced after poor performance associated with
stock price declines.
The remaining lines in Table 3 show that the magnitude of the timing eﬀect increases with σ,
µ, φ, and (1−ω). The path-dependency and non-stationarity of investment and capital structure
should therefore be more pronounced in industries with high earnings volatility and little systematic
risk, in growth sectors, in ﬁrms with little speciﬁcity of physical or human capital, in ﬁrms with
low direct bankruptcy costs, with low marginal corporate tax rates, and during regimes with less
double-taxation of corporate income.
243.2.5 How does personal taxation aﬀect the interaction between corporate investment
and ﬁnancial policy?
Under realization-based capital gains taxation the ﬁrm’s investment and ﬁnancial policy interact.
The basis-to-price ratio at the investment date κu (BPu-ratio) or, equivalently, the value of the state
variable Mκu = m determine the optimal ﬁnancing mix for the investment project. Proposition 4
shows that the investment project is ﬁnanced with more equity the higher the BPu-ratio, or the
smaller m. The ﬁnancial policy, in turn, aﬀects the optimal timing of corporate investment through
its impact on shareholders’ tax timing option as shown in Section 3.2.3. As shareholders realize
losses, the BPu-ratio drops for two reasons. The tax basis declines and the optimal investment
trigger shifts upwards, since shareholders with low basis are willing to wait longer until real option
exercise than high basis shareholders. Low basis shareholders also prefer to raise equity. More
equity ﬁnancing, in turn, alters the option value to wait. The optimal investment trigger given
m, u(m|c1), is a U-shaped function of the debt coupon c1. Hence, the direction of the interaction
depends on whether the optimal debt coupon lies on the down- or on the upward sloping part of
the functional c1 7→ u(m|c1).
The size of the investment project is an important determinant of the direction of the interaction.
The project size relative to existing operations is governed by the coeﬃcient π. Depending on π,
ﬁnancial ﬂexibility either dampens or exacerbates the timing eﬀect:
• For small project sizes (π large), the optimal investment trigger is monotonically decreasing
in c1. In this case, more equity ﬁnancing as m falls increases the option value to wait. The
longer wait, in turn, increases the BPu-ratio further, and the ﬁrm’s management responds
by issuing ever more equity. Optimal ﬁnancing thus reinforces investment delay.
• For large investment projects (π small), optimal ﬁnancing dampens the deferral eﬀect. In
this case, equity ﬁnancing decreases the option value to wait, since the optimal c1 lies on the
upward-sloping portion of c1 7→ u(m|c1).
Table 4 conﬁrms that the investment and ﬁnancing patterns are qualitatively similar irrespective
of the project size. Across diﬀerent values for π, however, the cross-sectional range in both the
threshold Q and the target leverage ratio increase with π. The diﬀerence in investment thresholds
between m (BPu-ratio =0) and m (BPu-ratio =1) increases from 7 percent for π = 0% to 178
25percent for π = 100%. Similarly, the dispersion in target leverage ratios increases from 5.6 to 9.2
percentage points.
Investment is not always accelerated compared to an economy without capital gains taxation.
Investment is accelerated for all m ∈ [m,m] only if the size of the expansion project exceeds existing
operations by a factor of more than two (π ≤ 1/3) in the base parametrization. For π > 1/3, there
are ﬁrms postponing investment “excessively” after a suﬃciently large slump in operating proﬁts.
In this case, the critical threshold at which investment commences is for small enough m larger
than if capital gains were not taxed. The reason for this excessive delay, or underinvestment, is
the interaction between investment and ﬁnancing under realization-based capital gains taxation.
For small and medium-sized projects, more equity ﬁnancing leads to additional delay in investment
and, thus, reinforces the dependence on m of the investment trigger u(m). As a result, investment
is being delayed beyond the point at which it occurred if capital gains remained untaxed. For large
projects the interaction eﬀect is small and does not cause excessive delay.
3.3 How important are personal taxes for corporate capital budgeting?
To answer the question about the economic relevance of the eﬀects studied in the previous sections
I determine the gain in ﬁrm value that is being created by switching from a time-independent
investment and ﬁnancial policy—similar to McDonald and Siegel (1988) and Mauer and Sarkar
(2003)—to a state-dependent policy. More speciﬁcally, I ﬁrst determine the market-value max-
imizing investment threshold. Then I ask by how much the private valuation of the incumbent
shareholders—as a function of their tax basis—increases if the ﬁrm switches to a path-dependent
policy once the market-value maximizing constant threshold is being hit. In general, the value gain
depends on both the owners’ basis and the current share price. The relative gain before reaching
the market-value maximizing trigger is even larger than the numbers reported in Table 5.
Table 5 summarizes the results. Using the base parametrization summarized in Table 1, the
beneﬁt from switching to the optimal policy ranges between 0% and 5.6% of ﬁrm value depending
on the owners’ tax basis. For a basis equal to the stock price the two policies are identical, thus
oﬀering no gains. For a basis of nil they diﬀer the most, thus oﬀering the highest gains. In the
remaining parameterizations the increase in ﬁrm value ranges from 3.9% to 6.9% for a basis-to-price
26ratio of zero. These numbers are lower bounds in the sense that the relative gains are larger when
the stock price is below the myopic investment trigger. In particular, bankruptcy occurs sooner
under the myopic policy than under the state-dependent policy.
3.4 The Cross-Sectional Capital Structure Implications
The model makes strong predictions about external ﬁnancing and investment patterns in the cross-
section and time-series, in particular the cross-sectional relation between Tobin’s Q and leverage in
IPO time. To illustrate the basic economic relationships I simulate data generated from the model
using Monte-Carlo methods and then estimate cross-sectional capital structure regressions on the
simulated data similar to the empirical setup in Baker and Wurgler (2002) (BW, henceforth). I
include a measure of external ﬁnancing-weighted market-to-book, MBefwa, in a standard capital
structure regression and check if the measure has explanatory power for leverage in IPO time. BW
use this measure as a proxy for market-timing. If their measure is signiﬁcant in the simulated
data, it provides evidence against MBefwa being a good proxy for behavioral market timing.
The basic cross-sectional regression estimated in IPO time is
Lt = a0 + a1MB
efwa
t−1 + a2MBt−1 + f(Ft) + εt, (33)
where MB
efwa
t−1 is the lagged external-ﬁnancing weighted average market-to-book ratio, MBt−1 is
the lagged market-to-book ratio, and f(Ft) is an additive function of control variables measurable
with respect to the ﬁltration Ft. The market timing measure is deﬁned as
MB
efwa
t−1 = wt−1MB0 + (1 − wt−1)MBu. (34)
The weight wt−1 equals 1 if the ﬁrm has not invested by date t − 1, and otherwise it is wt−1 =
p0
t=0/(p0
t=0 + I) with p0
t=0 denoting the IPO proceeds.
The book value of the ﬁrm remains to be speciﬁed. I assume the change in book value at the
investment date κu equals the capital expenditure I as in Barclay et al. (2003). That is after date
t = κu the book value of the ﬁrm equals B0 + I and remains constant thereafter, which neglects
write-oﬀs. The initial book value B0 is deﬁned as the market value of a ﬁrm with operations of
27size π, coupon ﬂows c0, the ability to restructure at the original bankruptcy trigger l0, but with no
growth potential:
B0 ≡ βλπX0 + (φ−1 − 1)δc0 + (l0/X0)
γ
1−τ {[(1 − ω)ζ − β]λπl0 − (φ−1 − 1)δc0}, (35)
where X0 is the operating income level at t = 0 and ζ is given in Appendix C. This deﬁnition allows
disentangling the value of the growth opportunity from the value of existing operations—including
tax shields and loss oﬀsets.
The simulation procedure and the basic setup are described in Appendix B. Appendix B
also discusses the choice of parameter values. The base parametrization is summarized in Table
1. Descriptive statistics for the cross-sectional distribution of the resulting patterns in capital
structure and investment rates for years 1-10 after the IPO are reported in Table 6.
The ﬁrst panel of Table 6 shows that the market-to-book ratio in the IPO year—which is not
calibrated to the data—matches the empirical data remarkably well. Empirically it is 2.29 com-
pared to 2.33 in the simulated data. This provides support for using the book value deﬁnition
(35). The dynamic patterns of leverage ratios and asset growth rates are also similar to the COM-
PUSTAT data used in BW. Leverage ratios are low just after the IPO and increase subsequently.
Investment rates drop sharply after the peak in the second year following the IPO. The second
panel of Table 6 shows that in the simulated data the majority of ﬁrms invest soon after the IPO.
Their option value to wait is small, and therefore the investment threshold is reached sooner. The
remaining ﬁrms must have performed poorly for some time. Their optimal investment trigger has
shifted upwards which causes their investment hazard rates to drop.
For robustness, I report estimation results from three separate regression setups. The basic
setup (BW1) follows BW most closely. The controls f(·) include Xt and ln(Xt). Operating
income Xt controls for cross-sectional variation in operating performance, and ln(Xt) is a proxy for
the ﬁrm size variable in BW, the log of sales.21 In a second set of regressions (BW2), I include
investment ﬁxed eﬀect dummies. The third speciﬁcation (BW3) diﬀers from (BW1) in that I
21Alternatively, I have run regressions that control for lagged values of the state variable x, i.e., xt−1 and ln(xt−1),
and/or the time elapsed since the investment date κu. The results are similar and omitted. Coeﬃcient estimates,
however, are more noisy. For robustness, I have also run censored and truncated tobit regressions in which the group
of bankrupt ﬁrms enter with a leverage ratio of one. The coeﬃcient estimates are similar and omitted.
28exclude the subsample of ﬁrms that have not yet invested by the speciﬁed time in order to control
for investment ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 7 reports the estimation results. In the ﬁrst panel I report regression coeﬃcients on
book leverage and, respectively, in the second panel on market leverage. The most important
commonality is that in both panels the coeﬃcient a1 on the external-ﬁnancing weighted average
historical market-to-book ratio is negative in all time periods; the coeﬃcient a2 on lagged market-
to-book is close to zero, and even changes signs. In model (BW1), the coeﬃcient estimates are
increasing in IPO time. The same features have been observed empirically by BW.
The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is the main aspect in which the data diﬀers from the model.
In setup (BW1), the coeﬃcient a1 is 26 to 40 times larger than observed in the data. Yet, the
economic order of magnitude is about the same, since the standard deviation of MB
efwa
t−1 is 13 to 19
times larger empirically than in the simulated data. The reason is that the market-to-book ratio
at the IPO has a cross-sectional standard deviation in the data of approximately 140% whereas in
the simulated data there is by construction no variation. In the simulations I did not introduce
heterogeneity in the initial market-to-book in order to be able to separate endogenous variation in
the investment policy from diﬀerences in investment opportunities. As a result, the cross-sectional
variation in the market-to-book ratio after the IPO is by construction smaller in the simulated data
than in the actual data. In regression setup (BW2) I include a ﬁxed eﬀects dummy for investment.
The estimates for a1 are now smaller in magnitude and closer to the actual data—though still
higher by a factor of 3 − 7.
Regression setup (BW3) controls for investment ﬁxed eﬀects by excluding the subset of ﬁrms
that have not yet invested. This setup reveals another feature of the simulated data. The third
column in the body of Table 7 shows the coeﬃcient estimates for setup (BW3) are decreasing in
IPO time rather than increasing as documented by BW. The reason is that the cross-sectional
relation between the optimal investment threshold and the target leverage ratio, that results from
varying m ∈ [m,m], is decreasing and convex. In order to generate an increasing coeﬃcient
pattern, however, this relationship would have to be concave. Right after the IPO, only high
target leverage ﬁrms appear in the subsample of ﬁrms that already have invested. Firms with low
target leverage exercise their real option on average later. Thus the larger IPO+t the wider is
the range of the mapping between the threshold market-to-book and the target leverage that gets
29traced out in the simulated data. As a result, the coeﬃcient estimates change monotonically, but
in a direction opposite to the data.
Finally, Table 8 provides evidence that the model can match the persistence of market timing-
motivated external ﬁnancing on corporate leverage as documented in BW. In Table 8 I estimate
regression (33) with longer lag lengths, denoted ι. I report the estimates for the regressions on
leverage Lt at t = 10, i.e., ten years after the IPO. On the diﬀerent lines I vary the lags on MB
efwa
t−ι
and MBt−ι between 1 year and 9 years. The coeﬃcient estimates show that the eﬀect of MB
efwa
t−ι
on leverage is very persistent—both in terms of book and market leverage. Even for the largest
lag length of ι = 9 years, the coeﬃcient a1 is negative and large.22
In summary, the main patterns in BW are present in the simulated data. The coeﬃcient
estimates on the external ﬁnancing-weighted market-to-book ratio are negative, large and robust
to the lag length. The coeﬃcients on lagged market-to-book change signs and are negligible.
3.5 The Robustness of the Optimal Policy to Capital Market Imperfections
The assumption of perfect capital markets in Section 2.1 leads to consumption-portfolio separation
and allows a tractable solution to the model. Yet, in practice the value of the tax timing option
is limited. Investors trade for reasons other than tax timing and realize losses as well as gains.
Transaction costs, short-sale constraints, and wash-sale restrictions preclude investors from imple-
menting the optimal strategy prescribed by Proposition 1. Liquidity shocks force capital gains
realizations of investors without access to sophisticated tax avoidance schemes.
The results in this paper are robust to trading frictions since the economic beneﬁts documented
in Section 3.3 outweigh real-life transaction costs by orders of magnitudes. The predictions of the
model are also qualitatively robust to exogenous liquidity shocks, since although the latter reduce
the value of the embedded tax timing option they do not entirely eliminate the tax asymmetry at
the personal level that is necessary for distortions in corporate policy. Plenty of empirical support
shows that investors recognize the value of tax timing and optimize given the practical constraints.
22This result is not driven by the one-time nature of capital restructuring that is imposed in this paper for tractabil-
ity. I have simulated a model along the lines of Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) with repeated capital restructurings,
callable (riskless) debt, and realization-based capital gains taxation. The resulting capital structure patterns are
qualitatively similar to the ones in the model with a single opportunity to reﬁnance.
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The paper incorporates the lock-in eﬀect of realization-based capital gains taxation in a dynamic
capital budgeting problem. The model provides novel testable predictions about the cross-section
and time-series of external ﬁnancing, capital structure, and corporate investment. The ﬁrm’s op-
timal policy is non-stationary and path-dependent on past ﬁrm performance, since the endogenous
evolution of the owners’ capital gains tax basis aﬀects corporate decision making. Capital gains
taxation a priori encourages irreversible investment, since capital loss oﬀsets at the personal level
reduce investment risk in loss-states. This investment stimulus is, however, only transitory and
vanishes if investors realize capital losses before investment takes place. Ex-ante identical ﬁrms
thus follow very diﬀerent policies depending on their stock price evolution. Firms delay irreversible
investment further the lower the tax basis of their owners falls. The diﬀerence in threshold Q’s can
exceed 200%, and the expected investment dates of otherwise identical ﬁrms can be years apart. In
addition, capital gains taxation creates incentives to time external ﬁnancing. Firms use up to ten
percentage points more equity in their capital structure, the higher the stock price-to-basis ratio of
their owners. The interaction with the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial policy can even lead to underinvestment,
or “excessive” delay, relative to the case without capital gains taxation. The value gain from
conditioning on the owners’ tax basis exceeds four to seven percent.
The model is able to match recent empirical evidence on the cross-section of capital structures
for IPO ﬁrms. Firms that raise external ﬁnancing when their valuations are high have low target
leverage ratios. Given the evidence in the literature that the marginal investor is taxed, it is thus
not surprising that proxies for a ﬁrm’s history have explanatory power in leverage and investment
regressions. Empirical evidence of path-dependency in investment and ﬁnancing, therefore, do not
lend conclusive support for behavioral theories. In order to discriminate between dynamic trade-oﬀ
theories and alternative explanations, more suitable empirical proxies are needed.
The model has a variety of untested predictions that may allow constructing new tests of
personal tax eﬀects on corporate capital budgeting. Important extensions of the model left for
future work include the incorporation of repeated investment and capital restructuring, the analysis
of share repurchases, and the implications for governmental tax policy.
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35A Bankruptcy Procedure
The bankruptcy procedure is an important determinant of the costs and beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing. En-
dogenizing the bankruptcy decision precludes potential distortions from ineﬃcient bankruptcy that are not
the focus of this paper. The bankruptcy procedure is designed as follows: Debtholders take over the assets
of the ﬁrm in the event of bankruptcy. They then relever the ﬁrm to the ex-ante optimum by issuing new
debt and equity securities. Finally they pay the restructuring expenses which consume a constant fraction
ω ∈ (0,1] of the ﬁrm’s capital stock. This sequence of events minimizes overall bankruptcy costs, since the
basis is endogenous in the ex-ante decision problem. Indirect bankruptcy costs arise from lower interest
tax shields (due to a reduction in the face value of debt during reorganization) but are partially oﬀset by
higher personal tax-loss shields associated with the newly issued claims. The overall costs of bankruptcy,
denoted α with ω < α ≤ 1, require the solution to a ﬁxed-point problem that takes into account possible
bankruptcies in the future.
B Monte-Carlo Simulations
The artiﬁcial data set is constructed as follows: I take a sample of 100,000 ex-ante identical, mutually
independent ﬁrms. They have the same initial operating income, face value of debt, ﬁrm size, and investment
opportunity set. For each ﬁrm, I simulate 10 years of operating performance X and construct the minimum
process M. I discretize time into calendar weeks, ∆t = 1/52. Using a numerical solution for the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing, investment, and bankruptcy policy, I determine the bankruptcy date during period 0 or 1, and
the investment date if no prior default happens. I exclude observations where the ﬁrm defaults prior to
investment. At the end of each calendar year, I calculate the ratios of market-to-book (MBt), book leverage
(LB
t ), and market leverage (Lt) for the subsample of ﬁrms still alive. For all ﬁrms in period 1 I also record
the investment date κu, and at the investment date the market-to-book (MBu), book leverage (LB
u ), and
market leverage (Lu).
The numerical values for the parameters r, µ, σ, ω, τ, τc, τd, τp, I are summarized in Table 1. They
are a consensus of values found in the literature and in the tax code. I calibrate the remaining parameters
to match various features of the data reported in Baker and Wurgler (2001, 2002). I choose the initial
operating income πX0 such that the peak of investment is in the second year after the IPO. The resulting
investment pattern is very similar to asset growth rates reported in Table 1 of Baker and Wurgler (2001).
The calibrated ratio of X0 to u(max(m : m ≤ u(m))) is approximately 69.2 percent. Given X0, I pick the
coupon ﬂow c0 of the initial debt outstanding as to maximize the ﬁrm’s ex-ante market value. I obtain this
value by numerical optimization and using Monte-Carlo simulations for calculating the initial debt value D0
0
in each iteration. The optimal value equals c0 = 6.0, and the resulting optimal ex-ante leverage ratio is
approximately 39 percent. Finally, I calibrate the size of the expansion project, 1/π, to match the average
asset growth rate in years IPO+1 and IPO+2, i.e., the two years of maximum growth in the data (see Table
2 in Baker and Wurgler (2001) for comparison).
C Proofs
Proposition 1: The Optimal Tax Timing Policy.
Constantinides (1983, Theorem 1, p. 617) proves the special case with no leverage. Similarly, in this model
assumption (1) and time-homogeneity imply that both the optimal tax timing and bankruptcy policy are
trigger strategies. For brevity I suppress the dependence on m, and denote by b(B) the tax loss selling
36trigger for basis B, and by l the bankruptcy trigger. The stock price is denoted p(x), and the equity
valuation of shareholders with tax basis B is v(x;B).
Using Theorem 1 in Constantinides (1983) it remains to be shown that
l = b(0) ≤ b(B) for all B ≥ 0.
Equityholders may realize capital gains or losses at any time prior to default by selling their shares in
return for after-tax proceeds (1 − τ)p(x) + τB. The smooth-pasting condition for tax-loss selling at time t
when Xt = b(B) is
vx(b(B);B) = (1 − τ)px(b(B)). (36)
Conversely, if shareholders do not engage in tax loss selling before the ﬁrm declares bankruptcy, they are
left only with a tax credit τB for realized capital losses. The necessary condition for optimality when the
basis equals B is
vx(l;B) = 0. (37)
Absence of arbitrage requires px(x) ≥ 0 for all feasible x. The result now follows immediately from a com-
parison of (36) and (37) since vx(x;B) is continuous in x and the process X has no jumps. Shareholders’
optimal trading strategy is thus one of instantaneous control by keeping the basis-to-price ratio from ex-
ceeding unity. They defer capital gains, instantaneously recognize all capital losses, and keep resetting all
shares as long as the stock price is positive. This implies l = b(0). 
Proposition 2 and 3: The Firm’s Valuation and Bankruptcy Policy.
The Firm’s Valuation After Investment In the following, I take m and the ﬁrm’s policy (u(m),
c1(m), n1(m), l0, l1(m)) as given, and drop the dependence of m where obvious. I proceed in several steps:
a) All equityholders receive after-income tax per-share cash ﬂows (Xt − c1)(1 − τe)/n1 while the ﬁrm
is solvent. Equityholders may also realize capital gains or losses at any time prior to default by selling
their shares in return for after-tax proceeds (1 − τ)p1(Xt,m) + τB, where p1(·) denotes the stock price.
Time-homogeneity implies the optimal tax timing strategy can be described by a trigger function b1(m;B)
for B ≥ 0. Proposition 1 implies that the optimal trigger satisﬁes
p1(b1(m;B),m) = B. (38)
The optimal bankruptcy policy can also be identiﬁed with a trigger, denoted l1(m). I deﬁne the correspond-
ing stopping times by
κ1
b(m;B) ≡ inf(t ≥ κu : Xt ≤ b1(m;B)),
κ1
l(m) ≡ inf(t ≥ κu : Xt ≤ l1(m)).





















where the last term drops out since l1(m) = b1(m;0) ≤ b1(m;B) for all B ≥ 0. The solution is (17), and








l (m)] = (l1(m))γ(x)−γ. (40)
b) Using (38), the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions for optimal tax-loss selling can be used
to infer the stock price p1(x,m). For B ≥ 0 (see Constantinides (1983) and Williams (1985)),
v1(b1(m;B),m;B) = (1 − τ)p1(b1(m;B),m) + τB, (41)
v1
x(b1(m;B),m;B) = (1 − τ)p1
x(b1(m;B),m). (42)
Since (42) holds for arbitrary basis B ≥ 0 and (38) implies there is a one-to-one match between B and
b1(m;B), (42) holds for arbitrary x with B = p1(x,m). Hence, p1(x,m) solves the following ﬁrst-order











The last two conditions correspond to limited liability and equity value-maximizing bankruptcy. The
solution is (23).
c) Since all debt issues have, by assumption, the same priority and recovery rate in the event of bank-
ruptcy, it is suﬃcient to value the aggregate debt. Debtholders in aggregate receive after-tax coupon
ﬂows c1(1 − τp) while the ﬁrm is solvent, and (1 − ω) percent of the optimally recapitalized market value
V ∗(Xt) when the ﬁrm goes bankrupt. Debtholders can also claim capital loss oﬀsets in the same way as










d(x,m;D) = d1(m;D)γx−γ is the value of a basis-reset contingent claim, and d1(m;D) is the basis-
reset trigger. The market value of the aggregate debt is
D1(Xt,m) = D0(Xt,m) + dD(Xt,m),
where D0(Xt,m) and dD(Xt,m) are the market prices of the old and the new debt issue, respectively.






x(x,m;D1(x,m)), x > l1,








The last condition is that debt becomes riskless as x → ∞.
d) The market value V ∗(l1) reﬂects the rational expectation that the ﬁrm may go bankrupt again in
the future. Thus, V ∗(·) is the solution to a ﬁxed-point problem taking repeated future bankruptcies ad
inﬁnitum into account. I conjecture that the market value of the optimally relevered ﬁrm (excluding direct
38bankruptcy expenses) takes the simple aﬃne form
V ∗(Xt) = ζλXt,


















where the value ϕ1
l(x,m) of a bankruptcy-state contingent claim (excluding capital loss credits) is given by
(40) and
α = 1 − (1 − ω)ζξφ (> ω). (47)
e) The optimality conditions for equity value-maximizing default at Xt = l1 are
p1(l1,m) = v1(l1,m;0) = 0, (value-matching) (48)
p1
x(l1,m) = v1
















λx ))/n1. The bankruptcy threshold is thus unaﬀected by the
capital gains tax rate.
f) It remains to determine the coeﬃcient ζ. The market value of the optimally recapitalized ﬁrm (with
endogenous basis) is
V ∗(Xt) ≡ p∗(Xt,Xt) + D∗(Xt,Xt), (52)






where ϑ is a constant. The ﬁrst-order condition gives ϑ implicitly as the solution to the algebraic equation
(φ





1−τ [(βξ − 1) + αφ
−1] = 0
⇔ (φ






−1 − 1) + βξ{ω − (1 − ω)(φ
−1 − 1)ϑ}] = 0. (54)
After substitution, the coeﬃcient ζ is indeed constant, and equals
ζ = β[1 + (φ
−1 − 1)ϑ]. (55)







The expected time until bankruptcy, E(κ∗
l ), is ln(ϑ)/(µ−σ
2
2 ), the debt recovery ratio (1−ω)V ∗(l∗)/D∗(Xt,Xt)
39equals (1 − α)/(1 − αϑ
γ
1−τ ), and the value of a bankruptcy-state contingent claim (excluding capital gains
taxes and loss oﬀsets) is ϕ∗
l (Xt,Xt) = ϑ
γ. 
The Firm’s Valuation Before Investment Again I take the ﬁrm’s policy (u(m),c1(m),n1(m),l0,l1(m)),
m ∈ M, as given. I start by valuing equity at t ≤ κu ∧κ0
l. Private valuations before investment depend on
both the investor’s own basis B ∈ B0(m) and the current basis of the ﬁrm’s initial shareholders, p0(m,m).
The latter determines the optimal investment trigger u(m) and the ﬁnancing mix (c1(m),n1(m)). The set
of feasible tax bases in period 0 is B0(m) = {(B) : p0(m,m) ≤ B ≤ maxx≥m p0(u(x),x)}, m ∈ M, since
there exist no shares with B < p0(m,m). I proceed, again, in several steps:
a) Shareholders receive pre-tax cash ﬂows πXt − c0 while the ﬁrm takes no action (default or restruc-
turing). Once operating income Xt falls to b0(Mt;B), shareholders sell all shares with basis B and receive
after-tax proceeds per share of (1 − τ)p0(b0(Mt;B),Mt) + τB. When the ﬁrm exercises its real option,
equity is worth v1(u(Mt),Mt;B), where v1(·) is given by (17). The state-contingent claims ϕ0
b and ϕ0
u pay
either a single unit when Xt hits the basis-reset threshold b0(Mt;B) before the investment boundary u(Mt)









Using (13) and the appropriate boundary conditions (see Goldstein et al. (2001)), ϕ0
b and ϕ0
u equal (18) and
(19), respectively, and the functional form of v0(·) is (16).
b) The stock price before investment, p0(x,m), can again be determined using the optimality conditions
for tax-loss selling. The only caveat is that the conditions diﬀer dependent on whether the stock price is
at a historical low or not. In the former case, the relevant optimality conditions are those of the initial
shareholders. I start with the simpler case that Xt > Mt. In that case, the tax timing problem of an investors
with arbitrary tax basis B (larger than the current basis of the initial shareholders) is straightforward, since
m and the ﬁrm’s optimal policy (u(m),c1(m),n1(m)) are constant. Therefore, m can be treated as a
parameter. The optimality conditions for tax-loss selling are identical to (41, 42). After substitution of










where p0(x) ≡ p0(x,x) is the stock price functional at the diagonal (i.e., when the stock price is at a historical
minimum). Note that (57) has a singularity at u(m), and that the stock price is continuous but not smooth
across the investment boundary, i.e., p0
x(u(m),m) 6= p1
x(u(m),m).
c) It remains to determine p0(m) for m ∈ M. The representative initial shareholder must take into
consideration that the ﬁrm’s policy may depend on her tax timing decision. The state variable m for the
initial shareholders’ basis-reset trigger is a decision variable, and only at the optimum does it coincide with
the running minimum of X. A shareholder with tax basis B = p0(m) resets her basis whenever Xt hits m,
such that
v0(m,m;p0(m)) = p0(m), (value-matching) (58)
v0
x(m,m;p0(m)) = (1 − τ)p0
x(m). (smooth-pasting) (59)
40Last, bankruptcy is declared in period 0 when
v0(l0,l0;0) = p0(l0) = 0, (value-matching) (60)
v0
x(l0,l0;0) = p0
x(l0) = 0. (smooth-pasting) (61)
Again, there exists a one-to-one mapping in the set {(x,m) : x = m} between tax timing triggers and tax






x(x,x;p0(x)), l0 < x < u(x),





d) The solution to (57, 62) is a second-order Volterra integral equation for p0(x,m):















= {λπ + Φb(x,m)[p0(x,m) − (λπx − δc0)]








By introducing the function b1(x,m) ≡ b1(m;p0(x,m)), which determines how tax timing thresholds shift
after investment, (63) and thus (57, 62) can be reduced to the ﬁrst-order integral equation











































xη − xγ x−1,















Ψ2(x,m) ≡ {πλ − Φb(x,m)(πλx − δc0) + Φu(x,m)[(1/n1 − π)λu(m)
−δ(c1/n1 − c0) − Ψ1(x,m)(λb1(x,m) − δc1)/n1]}.

The Optimal Investment and Financing Policy
In the following, I start by taking m and the investment trigger u(m) as given and solve for the optimal
ﬁnancing mix c1 = c1(u(m),m) and n1 = n1(u(m),m). Then, I determine the investment trigger u(m) for
each m ∈ M while imposing optimal ﬁnancing. The optimal bankruptcy policy l1 = l1(c1) is given by (50).
The Budget Constraint At the investment date, the ﬁrm has demand I > 0 for external ﬁnancing.
The budget constraint is
p1(u(m),m)[n1(u(m),m) − 1] + dD(u(m),m) − I = 0. (65)
Eq. (65) says that if the ﬁrm decides to raise an amount dD(u(m),m) through new debt, the remainder
I − dD(u(m),m) must be ﬁnanced by issuing (n1(u(m),m) − 1) new shares. Hence,
n1(u(m),m) = 1 + (I − dD(u(m),m))/p1(u(m),m). (66)
From (65), the competitive equity oﬀer price is
p1(u(m),m) = E1(u(m),m) + dD(u(m),m) − I, (67)
where E1(·) denotes the ﬁrm’s equity market value
E1(x,m) ≡ p1(x,m)n1(x,m)
= βλx − δc1 − ϕ1
l(x,m)
1
1−τ (βλl1 − δc1). (68)
Using (68), (65) can be rewritten in terms of (c1,n1) as F(u(m),m|c1,n1) = 0, where
F(x,m|c1,n1) ≡ E1(x,m|c1)(1 −
1
n1) + dD(x,m|c1) − I.
42The Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) guarantees the existence of a policy function n1(x,m|c1) linking the



















Since the optimal bankruptcy trigger l1 = l1(c1) is aﬃne in c1,
∂


















∂l1E1(x,m|c1) = 0 by optimality of l1.
The Optimal Financing Given (x,m), the optimal ﬁnancing mix can be characterized by functions
c1(x,m) and n1(x,m|c1). The tax basis of the ﬁrm’s owners is B = p0(m,m). Optimal ﬁnancing at the
investment trigger x = u(m), thus, requires the following necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order condition to
hold for c1 ≥ 0:
∂
∂c1v1(u(m),m;p0(m,m)|c1,n1(u(m),m|c1)) = 0 (70)
The solution to (70) is a policy function m 7→ c1(m) for all feasible m ∈ M. In (70),
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∂l1v1(x,m;B|c1,n1) = 0 by optimality of l1 and b1 = b1(m;B), respec-
tively.
The Investment Threshold The optimal investment boundary m 7→ u(m) depends on the ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancial policy (c1(x,m),n1(x,m|c1)) et vice versa. Given m, optimality of the investment threshold u(m)
requires the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to be satisﬁed for a representative shareholder
with basis p0(m,m):






v1(x,m;p0(m,m)|c1(x,m),n1(x,m|c1)) ,x = u(m). (73)
43The r.h.s of (73) equals
∂
∂x



















where b1 = b1(m;B) and c1 can be treated as constants, since optimal ﬁnancing implies ∂
∂c1v1(x,m;B| c1,






















where c1 is again treated as a parameter, and
∂
∂x






























In turn, the l.h.s of (73) equals
∂
∂x






















xη − xγ u(m)−1,
where x ≡ b0(m;B)/u(m). 
Proposition 4: The Optimal Financing Comparative Statics
Denote the owners’ basis by B = p0(m,m) with reset trigger b0(m;B) = m, and let the ﬁrm’s operating
income at the investment date be x = u(m). The ﬁrm’s optimal ﬁnancial policy can be characterized as
a policy function c1(x,m|B) which represents the total promised debt coupon ﬂow after investment. The
number of shares outstanding after investment, n1(x,m|B), follows from the budget constraint (65).
44The claim to be veriﬁed is
∂
∂B
c1(x,m|B) ≥ 0. (74)















In order for (74) to be satisﬁed, the numerator in (75) must be positive, since the second-order optimality
condition for c1(x,m|B) implies that the denominator in (75) is negative. I deﬁne the numerator in (75)
























































∂b1 ]−1 ≥ 0,
which is positive since ∂











Hence, the claim (74) is veriﬁed if and only if at the optimal ﬁnancing mix,
∂p1(b1(m;B),m|c1)
∂c1 |c1=c1(x,m|B) ≤ 0,
The ﬁrst-order condition (70) implies that
∂(c1/n1)
∂c1 |c1=c1(x,m|B) = I(x,m;B|c1){[u(m) − ϕ1
b(u(m),m;B)b1(m;B)]
+ϕ1















45Therefore, using (71, 69) at c1 = c1(x,m|B),
∂p1(b1(m;B),m|c1)












= I(x,m;B|c1){β[b1(m;B) − ϕ1
l(b1(m;B),m)
1



















x − x1+γ for all z,x ∈ (0,1) (78)
where z ≡ l1/b1(m;B) and x ≡ b1(m;B)/u(m). By L’Hospital’s rule, the l.h.s of (78) is monotonically
increasing in z on (0,1) and bounded above by 1 + 1
γ, whereas the r.h.s of (78) is monotonically decreasing
in x and bounded below by 1 + 1
γ. 
46D Tables and Figures
Table 1
The Base Parametrization.
The table reports the values in the base parametrization of the various model parameters. They
reﬂect the recent U.S. tax code and otherwise represent consensus values of parameterizations found
in the literature.
Parameter Value Description
r 5% After-Tax Risk-Free Rate
µ 2% Drift of Operating Income Process under Q
σ 20% Volatility of Operating Income Process
ω 50% Direct Bankruptcy Cost
τ 25% Capital Gains Tax Rate
τp 30% Ordinary Income Tax Rate on Interest
τd 30% Ordinary Income Tax Rate on Dividends
τc 30% Eﬀective Corporate Income Tax Rate
1 − φ 30% Double-Taxation of Corporate Income
I 100 Capital Expenditure (Normalized)
47Table 2
The Financial Policy.
The table reports comparative statics for the ex-post optimal capital structure. The base parame-
trization is from Table 1, c0 = 0 and π = 100%.
Basis-Price Ratio
0% 50% 100% ∆ τ = 0%
Target Leverage (%)
Base 60.7 67.5 69.9 9.2% 66.4
τ = 15% 63.6 67.1 68.4 4.8% 66.4
τ = 35% 56.3 68.0 71.5 15.2% 66.4
µ = 1% 59.0 65.8 68.0 9.0% 64.6
µ = 3% 62.4 69.3 70.5 8.2% 68.3
σ = 15% 66.3 72.7 75.3 9.0% 72.0
σ = 25% 56.6 63.5 65.5 8.9% 62.2
r = 4% 59.3 66.3 68.5 9.2% 65.1
r = 6% 61.8 68.6 70.9 9.1% 67.5
φ = 75% 53.5 62.3 65.3 11.8% 61.4
φ = 65% 66.5 71.9 73.7 7.2% 70.7
ω = 25% 69.3 76.8 79.2 9.9% 77.1
ω = 100% 51.3 57.0 59.2 7.9% 54.1
Target Credit Spread (Basis Points)
Base 72 103 117 45 159
τ = 15% 106 125 134 28 159
τ = 35% 41 81 100 59 159
µ = 1% 90 125 139 49 188
µ = 3% 57 86 92 35 135
σ = 15% 37 58 71 34 96
σ = 25% 118 159 173 55 235
r = 4% 67 94 106 39 144
r = 6% 76 112 127 51 173
φ = 75% 53 85 98 46 135
φ = 65% 91 122 135 44 183
ω = 25% 83 122 138 55 190
ω = 100% 64 89 102 38 136
48Table 3
The Investment Policy.
The table reports comparative statics for the optimal investment threshold. The base parame-
trization is from Table 1, c0 = 0 and π = 100%.
Operating History (m − l0)/m
0% 33% 67% 100% ∆ τ = 0%
Investment Threshold u(m)/I (%)
Base 128.4 92.5 53.2 46.2 178% 94.4
τ = 15% 109.1 86.1 65.0 60.0 82% 94.4
τ = 35% 166.3 117.5 45.7 36.1 361% 94.4
µ = 1% 146.2 103.9 67.7 60.9 140% 107.8
µ = 3% 113.2 86.8 44.5 34.7 226% 83.2
σ = 15% 89.7 75.1 46.5 35.9 150% 66.4
σ = 25% 174.8 106.8 63.9 58.0 201% 129.9
r = 4% 112.6 75.2 39.9 34.8 223% 82.9
r = 6% 143.1 108.2 65.3 56.3 154% 105.2
φ = 75% 196.8 142.6 68.5 54.7 260% 122.4
φ = 65% 92.7 68.7 45.0 40.2 131% 75.9
ω = 25% 108.2 76.5 44.0 38.4 182% 75.9
ω = 100% 157.4 115.5 66.6 57.5 174% 123.4
Threshold Equity Value E0(u(m),m)/I
Base 10.8 7.3 3.7 3.0 260% 6.1
τ = 15% 8.2 6.2 4.4 3.9 109% 6.1
τ = 35% 16.2 10.8 3.3 2.3 592% 6.1
µ = 1% 9.7 6.4 3.7 3.2 205% 5.4
µ = 3% 13.7 10.1 4.6 3.3 313% 7.7
σ = 15% 6.5 5.2 2.8 1.9 238% 3.7
σ = 25% 16.3 9.3 5.0 4.3 276% 9.2
r = 4% 14.8 9.3 4.3 3.6 314% 8.3
r = 6% 8.8 6.3 3.3 2.7 231% 5.0
φ = 75% 20.1 13.9 5.7 4.2 377% 9.3
φ = 65% 6.5 4.5 2.6 2.2 192% 4.2
ω = 25% 7.4 4.7 2.2 1.8 311% 3.5
ω = 100% 16.0 11.3 5.9 4.9 225% 10.5
49Table 4
The Eﬀect of Project Size.
The table reports comparative statics for the investment threshold u(m) and the target leverage
ratio as a function of the size of the investment project relative to existing operations. Each line
represents a diﬀerent project size (1−π). The base parametrization is from Table 1. The capital
gains tax rate equals 25%.
Project Size Operating History (m − l0)/m
(1 − π) 0% 50% 100% ∆ τ = 0%
Investment Threshold u(m)/I (%)
0% 128.4 55.6 46.2 178% 94.4
10% 67.3 40.5 35.5 90% 60.5
20% 45.5 31.9 28.9 58% 44.4
30% 34.3 26.3 24.4 41% 35.0
40% 27.5 22.4 21.1 31% 28.9
50% 23.0 19.5 18.6 24% 24.7
60% 19.8 17.3 16.7 19% 21.5
70% 17.3 15.5 15.1 15% 19.0
80% 15.4 14.1 13.8 12% 17.1
90% 13.9 12.9 12.7 9% 15.5
100% 12.6 11.9 11.8 7% 14.2
Target Leverage (%)
0% 60.7 67.5 69.9 9.2% 66.4
10% 61.1 67.6 69.9 8.8% 66.4
20% 61.4 67.7 69.9 8.4% 66.4
30% 61.8 67.8 69.9 8.1% 66.4
40% 62.2 67.9 69.9 7.7% 66.4
50% 62.5 67.9 69.9 7.3% 66.4
60% 62.9 68.0 69.9 7.0% 66.4
70% 63.2 68.1 69.9 6.6% 66.4
80% 63.6 68.2 69.9 6.3% 66.4
90% 63.9 68.2 69.9 6.0% 66.4
100% 64.2 68.3 69.9 5.6% 66.4
50Table 5
The Value of Path-Dependency in the Firm’s Policy.
The table reports comparative statics for the increase in ﬁrm value from switching to the path-
dependent ﬁrm policy—evaluated at the market-value maximizing investment trigger. Each line
represents a diﬀerent parametrization. The base parametrization is from Table 1. The capital
gains tax rate equals 25%, and π = 100%.
Operating History (m − l0)/m
0% 33% 67% 100%
∆ Firm Value (%)
Base 5.6 3.8 2.0 0.0
µ = 1% 5.1 3.2 1.6 0.0
µ = 3% 6.4 4.6 2.7 0.0
σ = 15% 6.9 5.3 3.4 0.0
σ = 25% 4.5 2.7 1.2 0.0
r = 4% 5.4 3.5 1.8 0.0
r = 6% 5.8 4.0 2.2 0.0
φ = 75% 6.2 4.3 2.4 0.0
φ = 65% 5.1 3.3 1.7 0.0
ω = 25% 5.9 3.9 2.1 0.0
ω = 100% 3.9 2.7 1.5 0.0
51Table 6
The Simulated Data.
The table reports descriptive statistics for the simulated data set. The ﬁrst column for each
variable contains the sample average, and the second column the standard deviation. The number
of observations is 100,000. The base parametrization is summarized in Table 1. In the base
parametrization, the deﬁnition of book value is from (35), and π = 24%, c0 = 6.0, x0 = l0 +.692×
(m − l0).
(a) Descriptive Statistics




0 39.18 (0) 2.33 (0) 2.33 (0) – –
1 47.06 (14.14) 2.30 (0.05) 2.20 (0.44) 19.64 (46.63)
2 54.97 (16.77) 2.28 (0.07) 2.05 (0.52) 20.35 (47.32)
3 59.69 (17.21) 2.27 (0.07) 1.97 (0.59) 12.58 (38.49)
4 62.45 (17.21) 2.26 (0.07) 1.94 (0.68) 8.52 (32.23)
5 64.07 (17.19) 2.25 (0.07) 1.94 (0.76) 6.29 (27.93)
6 65.01 (17.25) 2.25 (0.07) 1.96 (0.84) 4.95 (24.91)
7 65.46 (17.29) 2.25 (0.07) 2.00 (0.92) 4.12 (22.81)
8 65.64 (17.40) 2.24 (0.07) 2.05 (1.01) 3.65 (21.51)
9 65.51 (17.60) 2.24 (0.07) 2.10 (1.11) 3.00 (19.55)
10 65.21 (17.83) 2.24 (0.07) 2.17 (1.20) 2.70 (18.56)
(b) Event Likelihood (%)
Bankrupt Invested, Bankrupt
IPO+t Inert before Invested Invested Not Bankrupt after Invested
0 100 0 0 0 0
1 84.9 0 15.1 15.1 0
2 69.3 0 30.7 30.6 0
3 59.6 0.1 40.3 39.9 0.4
4 52.8 0.4 46.7 45.4 1.3
5 47.5 1.1 51.4 48.8 2.6
6 43.0 2.1 54.9 50.8 4.1
7 39.1 3.1 57.8 51.9 5.9
8 35.5 4.3 60.3 52.5 7.7
9 32.3 5.5 62.2 52.6 9.6
10 29.5 6.6 63.9 52.6 11.3
52Table 7
The Capital Structure Regressions.
The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from capital structure regressions using simulated data. I run the following
cross-sectional regression speciﬁcation in IPO time
Lt = a0 + a1MB
efwa
t−1 + a2MBt−1 + f(Xt,κu) + εt.
In the speciﬁcation (BW1) the function f(·) is additive in ln(Xt) and Xt to control for contemporaneous variation
in ﬁrm size and operating performance. In the second set of regressions (BW2) I include investment ﬁxed eﬀects
1{κu≤t}, 1{κu≤t−1}. In the third set of regressions (BW3) I run the ﬁrst speciﬁcation on the subsample of ﬁrms
that have invested by time t − 1. Since in the model there is at most one external ﬁnancing event after the IPO, I
construct the external-ﬁnancing weighted average market-to-book ratio as MB
efwa
t−1 = wt−1MB0 +(1−wt−1)MBκu.




0 + I) otherwise. The base
parametrization is summarized in Table 1. In the base parametrization, the deﬁnition of book value is from (35),
and π = 24%, c
0 = 6.0, x0 = l











2 -186.4 8.6 -32.7 -0.1 -42.6 0.0
4 -242.1 2.4 -20.0 -0.2 -38.6 0.0
6 -261.5 0.8 -24.8 -0.3 -35.4 0.0
8 -266.9 0.2 -30.4 -0.3 -34.4 0.0
10 -274.3 -0.1 -34.4 -0.2 -34.2 0.0
Market Leverage
2 -215.4 9.9 -52.2 0.0 -52.2 0.0
4 -281.3 3.0 -46.6 0.0 -46.6 0.0
6 -306.0 1.2 -44.5 0.0 -44.5 0.0
8 -314.0 0.5 -43.4 0.0 -43.4 0.0
10 -324.4 0.2 -42.8 0.0 -42.8 0.0
53Table 8
Persistence in the Capital Structure Regressions.
The table reports coeﬃcient estimates from capital structure regressions with varying lag length using simulated
data. I run the following cross-sectional regression speciﬁcation for t = IPO + 10:
Lt = a0 + a1MB
efwa
t−ι + a2MBt−ι + f(Xt,κu) + εt.
In the speciﬁcation (BW1) the function f(·) is additive in ln(Xt) and Xt to control for contemporaneous variation
in ﬁrm size and operating performance. In the second set of regressions (BW2) I include investment ﬁxed eﬀects
1{κu≤t}, 1{κu≤t−ι}. In the third set of regressions (BW3) I run the ﬁrst speciﬁcation on the subsample of ﬁrms
that have invested by time t − ι. Since in the model there is at most one external ﬁnancing event after the IPO, I
construct the external-ﬁnancing weighted average market-to-book ratio as MB
efwa
t−ι = wt−ιMB0 +(1−wt−ι)MBκu.




0 + I) otherwise. The base
parametrization is summarized in Table 1. In the base parametrization, the deﬁnition of book value is from (35),
and π = 24%, c
0 = 6.0, x0 = l











1 -274.3 -0.1 -34.4 -0.2 -34.2 0.0
3 -198.0 1.0 -37.0 -0.1 -36.1 0.0
5 -138.9 2.4 -38.0 -0.1 -37.4 0.0
7 -92.4 4.7 -37.1 0.0 -38.1 0.0
9 -63.0 6.8 -38.9 0.2 -42.7 0.0
Market Leverage
1 -324.4 0.2 -42.8 0.0 -42.8 0.0
3 -233.9 1.3 -43.3 0.0 -43.4 0.0
5 -164.0 2.9 -44.1 0.0 -44.4 0.0
7 -109.1 5.6 -45.6 0.1 -46.5 0.0
9 -74.5 8.0 -52.0 0.3 -52.1 0.0

















55The FAME Research Paper Series 
 
The International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering (FAME) is a private foundation created 
in 1996 on the initiative of 21  leading partners of the finance and technology community, together with three 
Universities of the Lake Geneva Region (Switzerland). FAME is about Research, Doctoral Training, and Executive 
Education with “interfacing” activities such as the FAME lectures, the Research Day/Annual Meeting, and the 
Research Paper Series. 
 
The FAME Research Paper Series includes three types of contributions: First, it reports on the research carried out 
at FAME by students and research fellows; second, it includes research work contributed by Swiss academics and 
practitioners interested in a wider dissemination of their ideas, in practitioners' circles in particular; finally, 
prominent international contributions of particular interest to our constituency are included on a regular basis. 
Papers with strong practical implications are preceded by an Executive Summary, explaining in non-technical terms 
the question asked, discussing its relevance and outlining the answer provided.  
 
Martin Hoesli is acting Head of the Research Paper Series. Please email any comments or queries to the following 
address: Martin.Hoesli@hec.unige.ch. 
 
The following is a list of the 10 most recent FAME Research Papers. For a complete list, please visit our website at 
www.fame.ch under the heading ‘Faculty and Research, Research Paper Series, Complete List’. 
 
 




N°130   Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market 
  Richard C. GREEN, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Burton HOLLIFIELD, Tepper School 
of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Norman SCHURHOFF, HEC, University of Lausanne and FAME. 
   
N°129  House Prices, Fundamentals and Inflation 
  Angela BLACK, University of Aberdeen Business School, Patricia FRASER, University of Abredeen Business 
School, Martin HOESLI, University of Geneva, HEC, FAME, University of Aberdeen Business School. 
   
N°128  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov Type Test for Positive Quadrant Dependence 
Olivier SCAILLET, HEC, University of Geneva and FAME, January 2005 
 
N°127  Optimal Changes of Gaussian Measures with Applications to Finance 
Henry SCHELLHORN, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, May 2002 
 
N°126  The Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions 
Erwan MORELLEC, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, Alexei ZHDANOV, University of Rochester, 
October 2004 
 
N°125  Capital Structure, Credit Risk, and Macroeconomic Conditions 
Dirk HACKBARTH, Finance Department, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University, Jianjun MIAO, 
Department of Economics, University of Boston, Erwan MORELLEC, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, 
May 2004 
 
N°124  Developer's Expertise and the Dynamics of Financial Innovation: Theory and Evidence 
Helios HERRERA, ITAM, Enrique SCHROTH, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, 
October 2004 
 
N°123  A Double-Sided multiunit Combinatorial Auction for Substitutes: Theory and Algorithms 
Henry SCHELLHORN, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, December 2004 
 
N°122  Investment Under Uncertainty and Incomplete Markets 
Julien HUGONNIER, HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, Erwan MORELLEC, HEC-University of Lausanne 
and FAME, May 2004 
 
N°121  On the Debt Capacity of Growth Options 
Michael BARCLAY, Simon School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Erwan MORELLEC, 
HEC-University of Lausanne and FAME, Clifford W. SMITH, Simon School of Business Administration, University 
of Rochester, January 2003 
  
 
   
 
 
International Center FAME - Partner Institutions 
 
 
The University of Geneva 
The University of Geneva, originally known as the Academy of Geneva, was founded in 1559 by Jean 
Calvin and Theodore de Beze.  In 1873, The Academy of Geneva became the University of Geneva with the 
creation of a medical school.  The Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences was created in 1915.  The 
university is now composed of seven faculties of science; medicine; arts; law; economic and social sciences; 
psychology; education, and theology.  It also includes a school of translation and interpretation; an institute 
of architecture; seven interdisciplinary centers and six associated institutes. 
 
More than 13’000 students, the majority being foreigners, are enrolled in the various programs from the 
licence to high-level doctorates. A staff of more than 2’500 persons (professors, lecturers and assistants) is 
dedicated to the transmission and advancement of scientific knowledge through teaching as well as 
fundamental and applied research. The University of Geneva has been able to preserve the ancient European 
tradition of an academic community located in the heart of the city. This favors not only interaction between 
students, but also their integration in the population and in their participation of the particularly rich artistic 
and cultural life. http://www.unige.ch 
 
The University of Lausanne 
Founded as an academy in 1537, the University of Lausanne (UNIL) is a modern institution of higher 
education and advanced research.  Together with the neighboring Federal Polytechnic Institute of Lausanne, 
it comprises vast facilities and extends its influence beyond the city and the canton into regional, national, 
and international spheres. 
 
Lausanne is a comprehensive university composed of seven Schools and Faculties: religious studies; law; 
arts; social and political sciences; business; science and medicine. With its 9’000 students, it is a medium-
sized institution able to foster contact between students and professors as well as to encourage 
interdisciplinary work. The five humanities faculties and the science faculty are situated on the shores of 
Lake Leman in the Dorigny plains, a magnificent area of forest and fields that may have inspired the 
landscape depicted in Brueghel the Elder's masterpiece, the Harvesters.  The institutes and various centers of 
the School of Medicine are grouped around the hospitals in the center of Lausanne. The Institute of 
Biochemistry is located in Epalinges, in the northern hills overlooking the city. http://www.unil.ch 
 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
The Graduate Institute of International Studies is a teaching and research institution devoted to the study of 
international relations at the graduate level. It was founded in 1927 by Professor William Rappard to 
contribute through scholarships to the experience of international co-operation which the establishment of 
the League of Nations in Geneva represented at that time. The Institute is a self-governing foundation 
closely connected with, but independent of, the University of Geneva. 
 
The Institute attempts to be both international and pluridisciplinary. The subjects in its curriculum, the 
composition of its teaching staff and the diversity of origin of its student body, confer upon it its 
international character.  Professors teaching at the Institute come from all regions of the world, and the 
approximately 650 students arrive from some 60 different countries. Its international character is further 
emphasized by the use of both English and French as working languages. Its pluralistic approach - which 
draws upon the methods of  economics, history, law, and political science - reflects its aim to provide a 










2000 FAME Research Prize
Research Paper N¡ 16
FAME - International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering
THE GRADUATE INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
40, Bd. du Pont dÕArve
PO Box, 1211 Geneva 4
Switzerland 
Tel  (++4122) 312 09 61  
Fax (++4122) 312 10 26
http: //www.fame.ch 
E-mail: admin@fame.ch